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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT 
The basic purpose of employment law is "an attempt to protect workers and job 
applicants against the risks and irresponsibilities of unchecked employer power ... "1 For 
both employer and employee, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,2 is 
often considered the most significant of these laws. Under this statute, it is illegal for an 
employer to discriminate against any person on the basis of color, race, national origin, 
religion or sex in the terms and conditions of employment. 3 
Although not expressly stated in the Act, sexual harassment4 has become a 
1Rothstein, Knapp and Liebman, Cases and Materials on Employment Law (1987), 
xix. 
242 U.S.C. § 2000(e), et. seq.; (hereinafter "Title VII" or "the Act"). 
329 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 
prohibits discrimination in employment of persons over the age of 40; In 1978, Congress 
passed The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S. C § 2000e(k) which stipulates that sex 
discrimination includes discrimination based on pregnancy. 
4Sexual harassment in the workplace generally refers to unwanted sexual advances or 
requests for sexual favors. See infra, notes 28 - 40 and accompanying text. 
1 
2 
recognized form of discrimination under Title VII. Early case history, as revealed in 
Barnes v Train, 5 and Come v Bausch and Lomb, 6 demonstrates the initial reluctance of the 
federal judiciary to consider sexual harassment an unlawful employment practice. Here, 
the courts viewed sexual harassment not as discrimination, but rather as sexual misconduct 
or impropriety .1 The question of sexual harassment as a violation of Title VII did not 
reach the Supreme Court until twenty-four years after the enactment of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.8 In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson,9 the Court declared that a charge 
of sexual harassment was a legitimate and actionable claim of sex discrimination under 
Title VII. The Court further upheld the idea that sexual harassment could take one or 
both of the following forms: economic quid pro quo and/or hostile work environment. 10 
513 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 123 (D.D.C. 1974). 
6390 F.Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975). 
'See Barnes, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases at 124 ("regardless of how inexcusable the 
conduct of plaintiff's supervisor might have been, it does not evidence an arbitrary barrier 
to continued employment ... "); Come, 390 F.Supp. at 163 (" ... conduct appears to 
be nothing more than a personal proclivity, peculiarity or mannerism."). 
8See, e.g.,Hom v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599 (1985); Huebschen v Dept. of Health, 
716 F.2d 1167 (1983); Boben v City of East Chicago 622 F. Supp 1234 (N.D. Ind. 
1985); Scott v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 605 F. Supp.(N.D. Ill. 1985); Zabkowicz v West 
Bend, 589 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Wis. 1984). 
9106 S.Ct. 2399 (1986). 
1<The Court upheld the definitions rendered by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (hereinafter "EEOC" or "the Commission") (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 
1604.11), which held that "quid pro quo" harassment occurs when sexual advances or 
requests for sexual favors result in tangible job benefits or the denial thereof; hostile work 
environment sexual harassment occurs when this conduct has the effect of unreasonably 
intedering with job pedormance. See, generally, note 40 and accompanying text. 
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It has been argued, however, that sexual harassment is often more than 
discrimination11• In recent years, redress for charges of sexual harassment has been 
sought under the tort claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress,12 assault and/or 
battery13 and invasion of privacy. 14 This thesis will examine the applicability of the civil 
provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RIC0")15to claims 
of sexual harassment. 
This thesis will examine the legislative and judicial histories of the Civil Rights 
Act and RIC0. 16 In so doing, the types of actionable sexual harassment claims under 
Title VII will be identified and, where appropriate, extended to establish liability under 
RIC0. 11 
11See, e.g., Vhay, The Hanru of Asking: Towards a Comprehensive Treatment of 
Sexual Harassment, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 328, 329 (1988) ("the same difficulties that 
hindered the early courts in recognizing sexual harassment as sex discrimination prevent 
the modern-day courts from recognizing harassment as more than sex discrimination."). 
12See, e.g., Shaffer v National Can Corp., 565 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Rice 
v United Ins. Co. of America, 465 So. 2d 1100 (Ala. 1984). 
13See, e.g., Rogers v Loews L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, 526 F. Supp. 523 (D.D.C. 1981); 
Skousen v Nidy, 90 Ariz 215 (1966). 
14See, e.g., Phillips v Smalley Maintenance Services, Inc., 425 So.2d 705 (Ala. 
1983); Rogers v Loews L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, 526 F. Supp. 523 (D.D.C. 1981). 
1518 u.s.c. §§ 1961 - 1968. 
16See, generally, note 78 and accompanying text. 
11See, Hunt v Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Mass. 1986), infra at note 349. 
(alleged sexual harassment argued under the RICO law survives a motion to dismiss). 
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SCOPE OF ANALYSIS 
It is without question that our society has experienced marked changes in the past 
thirty years. 18 Given this significant transformation, the composition of the workforce 
has changed dramatically. 19 The large influx of women into the business community has 
created new challenges and raised many questions. 20 To comprehend sexual harassment 
in both its legal and social context requires an examination of its definition and its 
pervasiveness. While many attempts to clarify these aspects of sexual harassment have 
been made, the most significant of these endeavors, beginning with a 1975 survey 
conducted through Cornell University, 21 will be presented in Chapter 2. 
Any attempt to understand the judicial treatment given to sexual harassment claims 
necessitates a thorough investigation of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 
18See, generally, Johnston and Packer, Workforce 2000: Work and Workers for the 
Twenty-first Century, at 105 (1987) ("Most of the laws and policies that affect American 
jobs and workers were developed several decades ago . . . when economic conditions 
were different, world trade was less important, manufacturing was more dominant, and 
women and minorities were a smaller share of the workforce."). 
19ld. citing Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Hudson Institute reports that in 1960 only 
11 % of women with children under the age of six worked while presently this number has 
increased to 52 % . 
20ld. The Institute has identified "six challenges" including the reconciliation of the 
conflicting needs of women, work, and the family. Specifically, the necessity of 
providing more time off for parents, high quality day care and welfare reforms. 
21Reponed in Farley, Sexual Shakedown, (1978) at 20. 
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l964 and the amendments adopted in 1972.22 This will be presented in detail in Chapter 
3. In examining statutory case law history, Chapter 4 will identify the two forms of 
sexual harassment to which employees have been subjected, and court disposition of these 
claims. The judicial analysis of sexual harassment presented herein will reveal the 
evolution of sexual harassment law under Title VII as well as the administrative 
interpretation of Title VII' s prohibition on sex discrimination as applied to cases of sexual 
harassment. 
Having identified sexual harassment as a form of unlawful sex discrimination, 
Chapter 5 will detail the remedies available to the successful litigant. The adequacy of 
these remedies will be assessed in order to determine the need for an alternate form of 
redress. 
In order to offer the RICO law as a credible alternative remedy for claims of 
sexual harassment, it is essential to grasp the original intent of the law as passed in 1970 
and its subsequent judicial application. Chapter 6 will detail the legislative history of 
RICO as well as the elements necessary to establish a claim under the law. 
Chapter 7 will discuss the various uses of civil RICO provisions in the 
employment setting. In addition, the various judicial interpretations of the elements 
necessary for the application of the racketeering law will be illustrated. The application 
of these elements to claims of sexual harassment will be discussed. 
22Pub. L. No. 92-261, The Equal Employment Opportunity Act, primarily granted 
enforcement powers to the EEOC and made various changes in coverage of the law. See, 
genera/.ly, Bureau of National Affairs, The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 
(1973). 
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Finally, chapter 8 will examine the relationship between "quid pro quo" cases of 
sexual harassment litigated under Title VII to the RICO law. This will be done in order 
to demonstrate the possible use of the RICO law as an additional remedial tool for the 
victim of sexual harassment. 
ASSUMPTIONS OF STUDY 
Two basic assumptions underlie this research and form the basis of analysis 
contained herein. First, though sexual harassment can occur in many environments, this 
study will focus solely on the workplace. Second, while sexual harassment is typically a 
situation which involves a male harasser and a female victim, it is recognized that sexual 
harassment can and does involve a female harasser and a male victim,23 or homosexual 
relationships. 24 The bulk of the literature and case law in this area, however, is concerned 
primarily with sexual harassment where the female is the alleged victim and a male is the 
alleged perpetrator, and will be the essence of this investigation. 
23See, e.g., Heubschen v Dept. of Health, 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1983); Formica 
v Galastino, No. 89-935 (E.D. Penn. 1989). 
24See, e.g., Joyner v AAA Cooper Transportation 597 F. Supp. 537 (D. Ala. 1983); 
Wright v Methodist Youth Services 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
CHAPTER II 
AN OVERVIEW OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Though much has been written about the sexual harassment of working women in 
the past fifteen years, it is important to note that the occurrence of this behavior has 
existed for many years. 25 
Reports of sexual harassment, though then not defined as such, date back to late 
in the 19th Century. 26 Other later instances of sexual harassment have involved well-
known women such as Emma Goldman, who shared their experience with this issue as 
early as 1917. In "The Traffic in Women," Goldman wrote: 
Nowhere is woman treated according 
to the merit of her work, but rather 
as a sex. It is therefore almost 
inevitable that she should pay for her 
25See, generally, Goodman, Sexual Harassment: Some Observations on the Distance 
Travelled and the Distance Yet to Go, 10 Cap. U. L. Rev. 445 (1981) and Bulzarik, 
Sexual Harassment at the Workplace: Historical Notes, 12 Radical America 25 (July, 
1978). 
26Goodman, Sexual Harassment, supra note 1, at 448 (citing a report by Louisa May 
Alcott in How I went out to Service, N.Y. Independent, June 4, 1874, at 1, col. 1). 
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right to exist, to keep a position in 
whatever line, with sex favors. 27 
8 
With the advent of the women's movement in the early 1960's and its attendant increase 
in the number of women entering the paid labor force, it would be reasonable to expect 
the reports of sexual harassment to also increase. It was not until the late 1970's, 
however, that any extensive treatment of this issue was rendered. As will be 
demonstrated, the central focus of the research has been in attempting to define what 
behavior constitutes sexual harassment and a determination of its pervasiveness. 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT DEFINED 
Lin Farley's 1978 work, Sexual Shakedown, describes sexual harassment as 
"unsolicited nonreciprocal male behavior that asserts a women's sex role over her 
function as a worker. "28 Relying on the experiences shared with her by "working women 
across the nation, "29 Farley characterized the purpose of sexual harassment in traditional 
jobs (positions typically dominated by females) against nontraditional jobs (male 
dominated occupations). In her view, "the function of sexual harassment in 
nontraditional jobs is to keep women out; its function in the traditional female sector is 
to keep women down. "30 
The roots of sexual harassment, according to Farley, are found in the rise of 
21Goldman, The Traffic in Women, in Red Emma Speaks: An Emma Goldman Reader 
(A. Shulman, ed. 1982). 
28Farley, Sexual Shakedown, at 14 (1978). 
29/d. at xii. 
30/d. at 90. 
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American capitalism and the patriarchal society. 31 For decades women represented the 
undereducated, unskilled labor force necessary to insure profits in a free market economy 
controlled by the male population. These ideas of control have been perpetuated through 
"hiring policies that screen applicants first for sex appeal, regardless of skills and 
qualifications. "
32 
Farley concludes that though legal remedies do exist, particularly Title VII, they 
are time consuming and do not work well. In her view, collective action by women and 
publication in the media are the best alternatives available to combat the problem. 
The major impetus for a finding of sexual harassment as sex discrimination came 
with the 1979 publication of Catherine MacKinnon's Sexual Harassment of Working 
Women. 33 For MacKinnon, "sexual harassment, most broadly defined, refers to the 
unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of unequal 
power. "34 Using the then existing case law, as well as extensive interviews with victims 
of sexual harassment, MacKinnon asserts that: 
[I]n many instances, sexual requirements are used to deny women access 
to 'privileges' of employment. In situations in which sexual threats and 
coercion shape a woman's job definition and working environment, or 
cases in which job-related pressures are used to coerce sexual acquiescence 
31/d. at 208 ("The sexual harassment of women at work arose out of men's need to 
maintain his control of female labor . . . the abuse maintains the age-old requirement of 
the Patriarchy: that women shall serve man with her labor and pay for the right to do so 
with her body."). 
32/d. , at 92. 
3MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women (1979). 
34/d. at 1. 
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or involvement, sexual harassment is a 'term' and 'condition' of work. 35 
For MacKinnon, this is clearly a violation of Title VII and the argument that sexual 
harassment is an individual expression of urges founded on the idea of biological reality 
is sharply criticized. Women should not be expected to face the situations presented 
through sexual harassment. Title VII does represent a proper means to redress the 
grievance and MacKinnon advocates its use. 36 
A third definition of sexual harassment was offered prior to the publication of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's 1980 Guidelines on Discrimination 
Because of Sex ("Guidelines").37 Answering the invitation for public comment on the 
proposed amendment, Joan Vermuelen, as Director of the Working Women's Institute, 
defined sexual harassment as "any attention of a sexual nature in the context of a work 
situation which has the effect of making a woman uncomfortable on the job, impeding her 
ability to do her work, or intedering with her employment opportunities. '138 Lending 
solid support to the EEOC's effort to address the problem, Vermuelen argues that sexual 
harassment is more than an individual, personal problem. Rather, sexual harassment 
often results in psychological or physical dysfunction, striking at the core of a woman's 
35Jd. at 208. 
36See., e.g., Hoyman & Stallworth, Suit Filing by Women: An Empirical Analysis, 62 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 61 (1986); Hoyman & Stallworth, Who Files Suits and Why: An 
Empirical Ponrait of the Litigious Worker, 1981 U. Ill. L. Rev. 115. 
3729 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1980). 
38vermuelen, Comments on the Equal Employment Opponunity Commission's 
Proposed Amendment Adding Section 1604.11, Sexual Harassment, to Its Guidelines on 
Sexual Discrimination, 6 Women's Rights L. Rep. 285, 286 (1980). 
11 
productivity. 39 In general, sexual harassment contributes to female unemployment; 
specifically, economic hardship through loss of a job or denial of a promotion. 
In November, 1980, the EEOC issued it Final Guidelines on sexual harassment. 
In them the Commission stated that, Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual 
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual 
haraSsment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a 
term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such 
conduct by an individual as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, 
or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an 
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working 
. t 40 env1ronmen . 
It has been this operative definition under which the scores of sexual harassment claims 
have been filed with the EEOC and to which the Supreme Court, in the Meritor decision, 
accorded deference. 
PERVASIVENESS 
The efforts to establish sexual harassment as an issue relied heavily on the results 
of opinion surveys conducted in the late 1970's and early 1980's. One of the initial 
attempts to gather data took place in 1975, under the auspices of the Women's Section 
of Human Affairs Program at Cornell University. 41 Of the 155 responses to the 
questionnaire, 70% of the women reported personally experiencing some form of 
39Id. at 288 (citing Crull, The Impact of Sexual Harassment on the Job: A Profile of 
the Experiences of92 Women, Working Women's Institute Research Series,Repon No. 3 
(1979), a study which revealed psychological symptoms of fear, anger, decreased 
ambition and diminished job satisfaction; physical symptoms of nausea, headaches and 
weight change.). 
~9 C.F.R. § 1604.ll(a) (1980). 
41Farley, supra, at note 4, 20. 
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harassment. While admittedly too small a group on which to base generalizations, this 
was the first time that the term sexual harassment was used to describe the unwanted 
behavior between the sexes or genders at work. 
In January of 1976, Redhook attempted to provide the first comprehensive 
statistics on the issue of sexual harassment. By its own admission, Redhook does note 
that the 9,000 women who responded to the survey are a "self selected group -- meaning 
that women who felt strongly about this problem, probably because they had experienced 
it, were likelier to fill out our questionnaire than women who had escaped it. "42 
Nonetheless, the results of the survey indicated that 9 out of 10 women had to deal with 
unwanted sexual overtures, leading to the conclusion that "the problem is not epidemic; 
it is pandemic -- an everyday, everywhere occurrence. "43 
In a report entitled Sexual Harassment in the Federal Workplace: Is it a Problemt4 
the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board determined that sexual harassment affected one 
out of every four federal workers. Conducted over a two year period, the survey was 
sent to over 23,000 federal workers and generated an 85% response rate. While not 
condoning the situation, the Board did stress that in spite of the high affirmation of sexual 
harassment, many respondents who had worked elsewhere prior to joining the government 
did not feel the problem existed to any greater degree than in the private sector. The 
42Safran, What Men Do to Women on the Job: A Shocking Look at Sexual Harassment, 
148 Redhook 149, 219. (Nov. 1976). 
43/d. at 217. 
«u .S. Merit Sys. Protection Bd. Office of Merit Review and Studies, Sexual 
Harassment in the Federal Workplace: Is It a Problem (1981). (hereinafter Merit Report). 
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Board further estimated that the cost of sexual harassment, in terms of lost productivity 
and absenteeism, was approximately $189 million. 
A follow-up survey, conducted in 1987, has been reported in U.S. News and 
world Repon. The incidence of sexual harassment is estimated to be approximately 42 % , 
and "the percentages were virtually identical to those reported seven years ago. . . . "45 
The most current survey to date regarding the presence of sexual harassment was 
undertaken in 1988 by Working Woman. 46 Questionnaires were sent to the Fortune 500 
industrial and service companies, resulting in a 16% response rate. It was found that 
25 % of the companies received 6 or more complaints of sexual harassment each year. 
The companies surveyed reported that 64 % of the complaints received are valid, and one-
third of the companies have been subjected to a lawsuit based on alleged sexual 
harassment. Costs of sexual harassment are estimated to be approximately $6. 7 million 
per year for each company. 
CONFLICTING VIEWS 
In order to successfully deal with a problem, it is imperative to achieve consensus 
on its definition. As previously demonstrated, sexual harassment has been defined in 
many ways: behaviorally, sociologically and gender-specific. Throughout all the 
preceding definitions, the concept of "unwanted" is clear. The difficulty remains, 
45Hands Off at the Office, U.S. News and World Rep., Aug. 1, 1988, at 56. 
~androff, Sexual Harassment in the Fonune 500, Working Women, December 1988, 
at 69. 
14 
however, in precisely distinguishing what behavior constitutes sexual harassment. 47 
In 1980, data from a telephone survey of approximately 1200 working men and 
women in Los Angeles County was analyzed to determine perception about sexual 
harassment. The results of the survey indicated that "women are significantly more likely 
than men to label sexual behaviors at work as sexual harassment. 1148 
In 1981, a joint survey by Ha!"Vard Business Review and Redbook attempted to 
"measure opinions and awareness of the issues of sexual harassment in the workplace. "49 
While the results indicate that most see sexual harassment in the context of unequal 
power, "the striking finding on the question of how much abuse actually takes place is the 
difference in perception. "50 Asked about the recently issued EEOC Guidelines, 51 % of 
the male respondents found them reasonable and necessary as compared to 64 % of the 
female respondents; 11 % of the male respondents found the Guidelines to be unreasonable 
and very unnecessary, while only 2 % of the females had the same opinion. 
This idea of differing perceptions was reiterated by the Merit Systems Protection 
47See, e.g., Brewer, Funher Beyond Nine to Five: An Integration and Future 
Directions, 38 J. Soc. Issues 149 (1982) (arguing that behavior construed as sexual 
harassment falls into one of three categories: coercive/physically intrusive, offensive 
verbalization, or flirtation); Pryor, The Lay Person's Understanding of Sexual. 
Harassment, 13 Sex Roles 273 (1985) (arguing that sexual harassment is defined based 
on the social role of the alleged perpetrator, any past history of the alleged behavior and 
individual interpretation). 
~onrad & Gutek, Impact of Work Experiences on Attitudes toward Sexual. 
Harassment, 31 Ad. Sci. Q. 422, 437 (1986). 
49Collins & Blodgett, Sexual. Harassment ... Some See It ... Some Won't, 59 Harv. Bus. 
Rev. 76, 78. (1981). 
50/d. at 81. 
15 
aoard in reporting its findings. In its survey of the available literature through 1981, the 
aoard found that there was no common element in the behavior construed as sexual 
harassment. The Board suggests that, "there have been disagreements about what 
constitutes sexual harassment, how widespread it is and its consequence for 
employees ... 
11SI 
In 1987, the Graduate School of Business at Indiana State University conducted 
a survey of human resource practitioners at companies across the country. 52 Of the 1100 
representatives included, 247 responded to the questionnaire. Using actual statements for 
cases reported or litigated, the respondents were asked to determine if the behavior listed 
would be considered sexual harassment. It was found that the agreement rate was the 
highest in those instances that a tangible benefit was included as a factor in the statement. 
Obviously concerned with the increasing confusion about what action constitutes 
sexual harassment, the EEOC issued a 30 page notice 53 in November, 1988. In it, the 
Commission restates the findings of the courts both before and after the 1986 Meritor 
decision. The Notice is an attempt to assist in the determination of unwelcome conduct, 
evaluating claims of harassment and establishing employer liability. 54 
51Merit Report, supra note 20, at 19. 
52Ford & McLaughlin, Sexual Harassment at Work, 31 Bus. Horizons 14 (Nov. 1988). 
53Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Policy Guidance on Current Issues of 
Sexual Harassment, N-915.035 (Nov. 1988). 
54/d. at 19 (referring to the Supreme Court's Meritor decision which held that courts 
are to look to agency principles in determining employer liability, making it clear that 
employers do not assume automatic liability for the acts of supervisors). 
16 
Recent reports on and discussion of the occurrence of sexual harassment has 
focused on the idea that sexual harassment is more that just an employment problem: For 
many in the field of labor law, human resources and sociology, the issue of sexual 
harassment is inherently a social matter. Judith Vladek, a New York labor lawyer, 
argues that "the problem goes beyond specific incidents ... it goes to the whole issue of 
women's place in society. "55 Invited to speak on the issue of sexual harassment in a 
recent discussion sponsored by Business and Society Review, a Vice President of 
Corporate Communications, having dealt extensively with the issue of sexual harassment 
stated that, "sexual harassment is only the visible symptom of some deeper problem in 
OUr SOCiety ... "56 
Perhaps the most stinging assault on the current status of sexual harassment comes 
from the arena of sociology. Researchers, having studied the data gathered to date, have 
declared the statistics unreliable at best, having been collected through "surveys of 
convenience. "n Because the questions asked in the survey are always different, the 
problem is continually defined differently. They contend that, "as long as claims-makers 
lack empirical documentation to support their new definition of a condition as a social 
problem, the status quo definition will continue to dominate. uss In their view, sexual 
55Fritz, Sexual Harassment and the Working Women, 66 Personnel 4 (Feb. 1989). 
"Hillman, Inuzka, Ott, Manley & Bryant, Is Sexual Harassment Still on the Job?, 61 
Bus. & Soc. Rev. 5 (Fall, 1988). 
57Gillespie & Leffler, The Politics of Research and Methodology in Claims-Making 
Activities: Social Science and Sexual Harassment, 34 Soc. Probs. 490, 493 (1987). 
58/d. at 495. 
17 
harassment is not taken as seriously as it should be. 
CHAPTER III 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE VII AND SEX DISCRIMINATION 
During the first six months of 1963, President Kennedy issued two messages to 
Congress calling for the enactment of federal civil rights legislation. 59 The first of these 
directives, issued February 28, 1963, provided the fundamental rationale for ending racial 
discrimination. "The basic reason," Kennedy wrote, "is because it is right. "60 While the 
events of the early 1960's are a matter of record, by mid-June 1963 the United States was 
in the throes of a "national domestic crisis, 1161 which made " ... enactment of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1963 ... imperative. 1162 In his second message to Congress dated June 
19, 1963, Kennedy outlined the various provisions of the proposed legislation, with 
particular emphasis given to fair employment regulation. It was only through an increase 
in jobs, education and training along with the elimination of racial discrimination that 
591963 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1507, 1526. 
60/d. at 1507. 
61/d. at 1535. 
62/d. at 1536. 
18 
19 
other rights afforded by the law would have meaning. 
63 
Immediately following Kennedy's message, on June 20, 1963, Rep. Emanuel 
Celler (D. N. Y.), Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, introduced H.R. 7152, 
a comprehensive civil rights bill. So began one of the toughest legislative issues to face 
a modern Congress. 64 
From the outset, proponents of this civil rights legislation faced stiff opposition, 
most notably in the person of Howard W. Smith (D. Va.), Chairman of the House Rules 
Committee. 65 It is in the Rules Committee that pending bills reached the floor or became 
roadblocked, depending on their administrative support or lack thereof. While Smith was 
a Democrat, the Kennedy administration did not receive his support for the legislation 
being contemplated. First and foremost a state's rights politician, Smith opposed this civil 
rights measure as yet another attempt by the federal government to erode state regulatory 
power. According to Smith, it was "time, not law, 1166 which would end the existing 
practices of discrimination. It was for this reason that Smith would make every effort to 
obstruct passage of this legislation, as he had done in 1957 and again in 1960.67 
63/d. at 1531. 
64See, generally, C. & B. Whalen, The Longest Debate (1985). 
65See, generally, Dierenfield, Keeper of the Rules (1987). 
66ld. at 193. 
67In 1957, Smith took an unexpected vacation upon receipt from the Senate of the civil 
rights bill, thus delaying any further discussion on the measure. In 1960, Smith aligned 
fellow Democrats to vote for a liberal amendment to one section of the pending 
legislation, then backed Republicans to defeat the section when a full vote was taken. See, 
generally, Dierenfield, supra at 7, 150-153 and 169-171. 
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No less important was Smith's anti-labor position. Throughout his career on 
Capitol Hill, Smith vigorously challenged legislation favorable to labor, including such 
New Deal programs as the National Industrial Recovery Administration,68 the National 
Labor Relations Act69 and the Fair Labor Standards Act. 70 During the 1940's, Smith was 
one of the principle authors of the War Labor Disputes Bill (the Smith-Connolly Act)71, 
intended to limit the right of organized labor to strike. In the late 1950's, in light of the 
recent findings of the McClellan Committee concerning union corruption, Smith 
spearheaded a coalition favoring passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act72 , aimed at 
controlling internal union affairs. 
A second major obstacle encountered by supporters of the civil rights bill, 
particularly in relation to employment, is found in the checkered history of fair 
employment practice ("PEP") legislation73• The first inroad regarding FEP laws came in 
1941 with Executive Order 8802, issued by President Franklin Roosevelt. Limited to 
federally sponsored programs, the Order called for "participation in the national defense 
68National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933). 
6949 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended; 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982). 
1°'29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1982). 
71Pub. L. No. 89; 57 Stat. 163 (1943). 
12Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519 ( 1959, as 
amended; 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982). 
13See, generally, Hill, The Fair Employment Practices Committee 1941-1946, in Black 
Labor and the American Legal System ( 1977). 
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program regardless of race, creed, color, or national origin .. "
74 But the 
Commission established under E.O. 8802 had no enforcement power and "so it 
concentrated on drafting policies and conducting public hearings. "75 A second PEP 
committee was instituted by Roosevelt in 1943, bolstered by greater jurisdiction and staff 
members. However, its enforcement powers were still sorely lacking and its authority 
expired at the end of June, 1946. From 1943 until passage of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, "literally hundreds of bills were filed seeking PEP legislation at the federal level; 
all died, usually in the House or Senate Committee to which the bill was referred, and 
at times, if a bill was reported and reached the Senate floor, it died as the result of a 
Senate filibuster. "76 The need for federal PEP law was recognized, though not by 
everyone. Therefore, it was not until 1964 that enactment of this legislation would occur. 
Finally, in considering the proposed civil rights bill, Congress would be forced 
to reconcile two, often conflicting, obligations: the moral and the civic. When President 
Kennedy sent his message to Congress in June, 1963, he asked, "every Member of 
Congress to set aside sectional and political ties, and to look at this issue from the 
viewpoint of the Nation. I ask you to look into your hearts ... for the one plain, proud, 
and priceless quality that unites us all as Americans; a sense of justice. "77 For many 
Congressmen, however, justice had to be tempered with constitutionality, procedure and 
74Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 P.R. 3109 (1941). 
75Background of the FEP Law, in The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (1964) at 10. 
16vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 431 (1966). 
77 1963 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1536. 
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balance of power. 
78 
It was on these grounds, therefore, that H.R. 7152 was most adamantly debated; 
and of the ten titles contained in the bill, none received as much attention as Title VII. 
While Congress was willing to accept the challenge offered by President Kennedy, the 
unprecedented movement into the arena of private employment made that invitation even 
more difficult. 
Title VII of H.R. 7152 called for equal employment opportunity and outlined the 
unlawful employment practices based on "race, color, religion, or national origin. "79 In 
addition, Title VII called for the establishment of an Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission which "must confine its activities to correcting abuse, not promoting 
equality with mathematical certainty. "80 Title VII also required settlement of claims 
through trials de novo, leaving the proposed Commission with little enforcement powers. 
It was not until January, 1964, that the House Rules Committee began public 
78Additional Views of Hon. George Meader. ("Congress has an obligation to carry out 
national policy with respect to civil rights . . . But the Congress should not attempt to 
violate other constitutional provisions . . . it should not seek to destroy protections of 
citizens guaranteed by the Bill of Rights."); Additional Views of Hon. Arch A. Moore, 
Jr. ("civil rights is the foremost issue of our times. But, to attempt to enact legislation 
in the heavyhanded and politically motivated manner that is presently being attempted is 
a disservice to the democratic process ... "); Minority Report Upon Proposed Civil 
Rights Act of 1963, Committee on Judiciary Substitute for H.R. 7152. ("The reported bill 
is not a 'moderate' bill and it has not been 'watered down.' It constitutes the greatest 
grasp for executive power conceived in the 20th century.") House Judiciary Committee 
Report No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reprinted in U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, 1 Legislative History of Titles VII and XI of Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, at 2043, 2062, 2064 (undated) [hereinafter referred to as "Leg. Hist."] 
19Leg. Hist. , at 2010. 
81.Jld. at 2150. 
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debate on the proposed legislation. Under the deft leadership of Rep. Smith, H.R. 7152 
was ignored for the last six weeks of 1963, until Congressional pressure was such that 
Smith was forced to consider "this nefarious bill. 1181 During the period from January 31, 
1964 to February 10, 1964, no less than 47 amendments to Title VII were suggested, of 
which 18 were accepted. 82 As originally submitted, the House Judiciary Committee report 
to accompany H.R. 7152 stated "the purpose of this title is to eliminate, through the 
utilization of formal and informal remedial procedures, discrimination in employment 
based on race, color, religion, or national origin. "83 
The question of sex discrimination did not reach the House floor until February 
8, 1964, and was introduced by Rep. Smith as an attempt to defeat the bill. According 
to fellow Rules Committee member, Carl Elliott (D. Ala.), "Smith didn't give a damn 
about women's rights, black rights, equality. He was trying to knock off votes either 
then or down the line because there was always a hard core of men who didn't favor 
women's rights. "84 Motive nonetheless, the amendment stirred debate for two days, and 
led to "women's aftemoon"85 in the House chambers. The basic disagreement centered 
81Dierenfield, Keeper of the Rules at 192. 
82Leg. Hist. , apps. 1 - 3. 
83ld. at 2026. 
840berdorfer, 'Judge' Smith Moves with Deliberate Drag, New York Times Magazine, 
Jan. 12, 1964 at 85. 
SSUg. Hist. at 3221 (Statement of Rep. E. Green). 
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on the belief that by including sex as a prohibited category of discrimination, the 
legislation aimed at protecting the rights of the black population would have less meaning. 
Though the problems facing women in the workplace were a matter of concern at the 
time, 86 uppermost in the minds of the House members was "our primary objective of 
ending that discrimination that is most serious, most urgent, most tragic, and most 
widespread against the Negroes of our country. "87 Perhaps the strongest argument against 
adding sex to the legislation came from a report issued by the President's Commission on 
the Status of Women. Referred to in a letter from the Department of Labor, it was 
determined that "discrimination based on sex ... involves problems sufficiently different 
from discrimination based on other factors listed to make separate treatment preferable. "88 
A third argument against adding sex to list of proscribed categories was grounded 
on the idea that adequate support for the amendment had not been demonstrated. 
According to Rep. Edith Green (D., OR): 
May I say, Mr. Chairman, to the best of my knowledge,there was not one 
word of testimony in regard to this amendment given before the Committee 
on the Judiciary of the House or before the Committee on Education and 
Labor of the House, where this bill was considered. I repeat -- there was 
not one single bit of testimony given in regard to this amendment. There 
was not one single organization in the entire United States that petitioned 
86In 1961, President Kennedy established the President's Commission on the Status 
of Women, charged with the responsibility of reviewing the "differences in the legal 
treatment of men and women in regard to political and civil rights, 11 as well as providing 
recommendations for "additional affirmative steps which should be taken through 
legislation, executive or administrative action to assure nondiscrimination on the basis of 
sex and to enhance constructive employment opportunities for women." Exec. Order No. 
10980, 26 F.R.12059, reprinted in 1961 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 4252. 
8Leg. Hist. at 3222 (Statement of Rep. E. Green). 
88/d. at 3214. (Statement of Rep. E. Celler). 
either one of these committees to add this amendment to the bill. There 
was not one single Member of the House who came to the Committee on 
Education and Labor or who came to the Committee on the Judiciary and 
offered such an amendment. 89 
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Notwithstanding the debate, the sex discrimination amendment passed the House by a 
vote of 168 to 133. 90 Regardless of the "considerable confusion "91 of that day, the 
majority of the House that voted on the issue appeared to agree that "the addition of that 
little, terrifying word 's-e-x' will not hurt this legislation in any way. In fact, it will 
improve it. It wm make it comprehensive. It will make it logical. It will make it 
right. "92 Following the adoption of the sex discrimination revision, the House voted to 
allow sex discrimination in those instances where sex is a bona fide occupational 
qualification "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or 
enterprise. "93 
H.R. 7152 was sent to the Senate on February 17, 1964 where the questions of 
procedure were hotly contested. 94 The bill did not reach the Senate floor for consideration 
until March 30, 1964 which began a filibuster lasting until cloture was voted on June 10, 
89/d. at 3223. (Statement of Rep. E. Green). 
90/d. at 3228. 
91/d. at 3229. 
92/d. at 3221. (Statement of Rep. St. George). 
93§ 703(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). 
94vaas, Title VII, at 444 argues, "Seldom has similar legislation been debated with 
greater consciousness of the need for 'legislative history,' or with greater care in the 
making thereof, to guide the courts in interpreting and applying the law. " 
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1964. Throughout this period, bipartisan support for the bill was generated through the 
able direction of Senators Humphrey, (D. Minn.) Dirksen (R. Ill.) and Kuchel (R. Cal.). 
Working with House leaders and the Justice Department, the Senators attempted to insure 
that amendments accepted in the Senate would survive any additional changes in the 
House. In the debate that ensued, the Senate considered 24 amendments to Title VII, of 
which five were adopted. 95 
The discussion concerning sex discrimination was virtually non-existent in the 
Senate, save for some remarks made by Sen. Dirksen in a memorandum to the floor 
managers of the bill. 96 What little dialogue there was regarding this part of the legislation 
finally enacted was intended purely as a matter of clarification. Offered by Senator 
Bennett (R. Utah), an amendment was submitted because "I do not believe sufficient 
attention may have been paid to possible conflicts between the wholesale insertion of the 
word 'sex' in the bill and in the Equal Pay Act. "97 The Bennett amendment98 was agreed 
to and consequently allowed for wage differentials based on sex where such disparity in 
95Leg. Hist., apps. 7 & 8. 
96In addition to numerous questions regarding recordkeeping requirements, state laws 
and seniority, Dirksen expressed his concerns on sex discrimination. He maintained that, 
"frankly, I always like to discriminate in favor of the fairer sex. I hope that the might 
of the Federal Government will not enjoin me from such discrimination." Senator Clark, 
(D., Pa.) assured Dirksen that the BFOQ provision would continue to allow protective 
discrimination for women. Leg. Hist. at 3013. 
97Leg. Hist. at 3233; The Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), was passed in 1963 
as an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act. Under this law, pay differentials for 
substantially similar work were prohibited absent certain conditions authorizing any 
disparity. 
98The Bennett Amendment became § 703(h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). 
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wages is authorized by the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
In attempting to delineate the role of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, which would be set up to enforce the Act, 99 the Senate had the goal of 
"allaying the fear that the EEOC would develop into another expensive octopus like the 
NLRB ... 11100 To that end, Sections 705 and 706 expressly stated the jurisdiction and 
enforcement powers of the Commission. 101 Under the Senate version of H.R. 7152, the 
EEOC could establish state and regional offices "as it deems necessary to accomplish the 
purposes of this title. 11102 The EEOC was not, however, granted any further enforcement 
powers. The role of the Commission was "to eliminate any such alleged unlawful 
employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion. "103 
99 At the time the Act was being debated, 25 states and Puerto Rico had mandatory 
FEP laws. The first of these laws were passed in New York as early as 1945. See, 
generally, Bureau of National Affairs, State Fair Employment Laws and Their 
Administration (1964). Recognizing the importance of these laws, § 706(c)(d) and (e) 
required exhaustion of state remedies prior to proceeding with a charge through the 
EEOC. For a detailed judicial discussion concerning the interplay of state and federal 
discrimination laws, see, Mohasco v Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980) and Kremer v Chemical 
Constructors, 456 U.S. 461(1981). See, also, Garbutt, Rights, Remedies and Procedures 
Under Illinois Law, (1984). 
100Vaas, "Title VII," 450. 
101The EEOC was granted power to investigate, determine reasonable cause and where 
reasonable cause was found, to attempt settlement. (This lack of enforcement power 
created a 'toothless tiger.' See, Hunter & Branch, Equal Employment Opportunity's: 
Administrative Procedures and Judicial Developments Under Title Vil of the Ovil Rights 
Act of1964 and the Equal Employment Opponunity Act of 1972, 18 How. L. J. 543, 543 
(1975). 
102§ 705, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-4(f). 
103§ 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e 5(b). 
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Failing this, the Commission would notify the complainant that it found reasonable 
cause for a violation and that the aggrieved party could sue the charged party in federal 
court. The Senate further modified H.R. 7152 by granting the Commission the authority 
to "refer matters to the Attorney General with recommendations for intervention in a civil 
action brought by an aggrieved party ... "104 and to provide counsel and assistance when 
necessary. 
Having completed its examination of and amendments to the House version of the 
civil rights bill, the Senate referred the bill back to the House on June 30, 1964. Passed 
by a final vote of 289 - 126, 105 the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was signed by President 
Johnson on July 2, 1964. After months of struggle, Congress had accomplished the 
virtually impossible task of uniting the myriad political, social and moral contingencies 
into an omnibus piece of legislation. To be sure, legislation of this nature and magnitude 
was not without its critics. However, "while not the final answer - that lies in men's 
hearts - Title VII nevertheless makes an honest attempt to strike at the vicious circle of 
poverty and ignorance, which is the crux of discrimination. 11106 
In 1972, Congress amended the Civil Rights Act because "the persistence of 
discrimination, and it detrimental effects require a reaffirmation of our national policy of 
104§ 705, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(6). 
10SUg. Hist. at 11. 
1°1Jlakey, Discrimination, Unions, and Title VII, America 111, 212 (1964). 
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equal opportunity in employment. "101 Citing the "heroic effort" 108 of the EEOC, Congress 
recognized the need to substantially increase the enforcement powers of the Commission 
in order to deal with charges of discrimination. 109 Toward that end, the House Committee 
on Education and Labor introduced H.R. 1746 on June 2, 1971 with recommendations 
that the bill be passed. 
Originally, the reported measure granted the EEOC the power to issue cease and 
desist orders. In addition, the functions of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance 
Programs (OFCCP) and the authority of the Attorney General in practice or pattern suits 
would be transferred to the Commission. This proposal, however, met with some 
disapproval. Chief among the critiques was that an extension of EEOC jurisdiction, in 
the form of consolidation with the OFCCP and the Attorney General's office, would 
hinder its enforcement capabilities, regardless of the cease and desist authority that was 
suggested. Based on Rep. Erlenborn's (R., IL) substitute amendment, the House voted 
not to grant cease and desist power, but rather to allow the EEOC to bring civil suits in 
federal court when conciliation efforts failed. In addition, though the functions of the 
Attorney General's office in practice or pattern cases was transferred to the Commission, 
the OFCCP remained a separate entity. The bill was passed in the House on September 
10Report to Accompany H.R. 1746, June 2, 1971 reprinted in The Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act of 1972 (1973): 157. 
108/d. at 157. 
109See, generally, Levin & Montcalmo, The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission: Progress, Problems, Prospects, 22 Lab. L.J. 771 (1971) and Controversy 
over the Enforcement Role of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 50 
Cong. Dig. 257 (1971). 
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16, 1971. 
In the Senate, the debate on Title VII was also centered on the enforcement 
powers of the EEOC. The Senate Labor Committee Report stated that "despite the 
national commitment of Congress to the goal of assuring equal employment opportunity 
for all our citizens, the machinery created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not in all 
respects equal to that commitment. 11110 
The Senate viewed Title VII as a failure111 not because its objectives were 
unsound, but rather because there was no method under which those objectives could be 
achieved more fully. To combat this problem, the Senate, like the House, voted to 
authorize the EEOC to bring civil suit against a charged party under the terms of the 
various provisions of the Act. 
Unlike the Congress in 1964, there was no substantial debate concerning the 
matter of sex discrimination. Both Houses, in 1972, acknowledged that women faced 
many problems in the workplace. According to the House Labor Committee, "women's 
rights are not judicial divertissements. Discrimination against women is no less serious 
than other forms of prohibited employment practices and is to be accorded the same 
degree of social concern given to any type of unlawful discrimination." 112 The problems 
110/d. at 228. 
111In discussing a need for the amendments, the Senate Labor Committee Report 
argued that "the resulting impasse between the EEOC and the employer has played a large 
part in the present failure of Title VII." Id. at 229. 
112/d. at 159. The Senate issued an almost verbatim opinion regarding the issue of 
women's rights, referring to the belief that these matters are often viewed as "frivolous 
divertissements." at 229. 
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noted, however, usually dealt solely with matters of compensation and position 
differentials. 
As approved on March 24, 1972, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 113 
amending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contained several other changes, most 
notably in coverage, exemptions and federal employment. What the revised statute did 
not do, however, was to definitively clarify the meaning of the term 'discrimination.' 
Though the objective of both the 1964 Act and its 1972 amendments was to end 
discrimination in employment, no definition of the nomenclature was included in either 
piece of legislation. In 1964, an interpretive memorandum on Title VII was issued by 
Senators Clark (D., PA) and Case (R., NJ) in which they stated: 
It has been suggested that the concept of discrimination is vague. In fact, 
it is clear and has no hidden meanings. To discriminate is to make a 
distinction, to make a difference in treatment or favor, and those 
distinctions or differences in treatment or favor which are prohibited by 
section 704 are those which are based on any five of the forbidden criteria: 
race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. 114 
Based on the history of Title VII, particularly during the 88th Congress, there was neither 
a Senate Committee Report nor a joint Senate-House Conference Report issued. 
Therefore, "with these usual guides to legislative intent missing, "115 it would become the 
113.P.L. 92-261, Committee Print. 
u'Leg. Hist., at 3042. 
115/d. at 3001. The lack of legislative history on the inclusion of 'sex' as a prohibited 
form of discrimination has been noted by the courts on numerous occasions. See, e.g., 
Gilbert v U.S., 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976) ("The legislative history of Title VII's 
prohibition of sex discrimination is notable primarily for its brevity."); Meritor Savings 
Bank, FSB v Vinson, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2404 (1986) ("we are left with little legislative 
history to guide us in interpreting the Act's prohibition against discrimination based on 
'sex'"); Commentators have argued that "[t]he sex amendment can best be described as 
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responsibility of the court system to determine exactly what action constituted a violation 
in the "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. "116 
In 1971, Judge Goldberg of the 5th Circuit stated: 
Congress chose neither to enumerate specific discriminatory practices, nor 
to elucidate in extenso the parameter of such nefarious activities. Rather, 
it pursued the path of wisdom by being unconstructive, knowing that 
constant change is the order of our day and that the seemingly reasonable 
practices of the present can easily become the injustices of the morrow. 
Time was when employment discrimination tended to be viewed as a series 
of isolated and distinguishable events ... [b]ut today employment 
discrimination is a far more complex and pervasive phenomenon, as the 
nuances and subtleties of discriminatory employment practices are no 
longer confined to bread and butter issues. 117 
an orphan, since neither the proponents nor the opponents of Title VII seem to have felt 
any responsibility for its presence in the bill. It is somewhat misleading, therefore, to 
speak of an "intent of Congress" with respect to its application, and the Commission and 
the courts will have to wrestle with the problems as best they can." Berg, Equal 
Employment Opponunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 Brooklyn L. Rev. 62, 62 
(1964). 
116§ 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), et. seq. 
11Rogers v EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (1971). 
CHAPTER IV 
JUDICIAL & ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII 
A review of early lower court cases of sexual harassment argued under Title VII 
reveal several judicial interpretations of the sex discrimination prohibition of the Act. 
District courts basically attempted to address whether sexual harassment constituted a 
violation of the law, 118 and if so, would the employer be liable for this violation. 119 In 
wrestling with the issues presented in a sexual harassment claim, the plaintiff had to prove 
that these incidents were violations of the law and not fundamentally personal matters 
between employees. 120 
118See infra notes 121-125 and accompany text. 
ll9See infra notes 126-129 and accompanying text. 
120See, e.g., Barnes v Train, 13 Fair Empt. Prac. Cases (BNA) 123, 124 (D.D.C. 
1974) ("This is a controversy underpinned by the subtleties of an inharmonious personal 
relationship."); Heelan v John's-Manville, 451 F. Supp. 1382, 1388 (D. Colo. 1978) 
(Recovery necessitates proof that actions were not an isolated attempt to establish a 
personal relationship). 
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In one of the first reported cases, Barnes v Train, 121 Plaintiff Paulette Barnes 
alleged that she was dismissed from her position with the Environmental Protection 
Agency for rebuffing her superior's sexual advances. The District Court for the District 
of Columbia stated that "conduct of the supervisor, regardless of how inexcusable it might 
have been, does not evidence arbitrary barriers to continued employment. "122 
In a second case, Corne v Bausch & Lomb, 123 plaintiffs argued that repeated verbal 
and physical abuse forced them to leave their positions with the employer The District 
Court dismissed the complaint stating that the alleged behavior served no purpose for the 
employer and was not part of company policy. Rather, the court said that this "conduct 
appears to be nothing more that a personal proclivity, peculiarity or mannerism . . . 
satisfying a personal urge. 11124 The judge further expressed his concern for granting relief 
on the basis that "holding such activity to be actionable under Title VII would be a 
potential federal lawsuit every time any employer made amorous or sexually oriented 
advance toward another. The only sure way an employer could avoid such charges would 
be to have employees who were asexual. 11125 
The notion of employer policy and individual behavior was reiterated in Miller v 
12113 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 123 (D.D.C. 1974). 
122/d. at 124. 
12~90 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975). 
124/d. at 163. 
125/d. 
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Bank of America, 126 in which plaintiff Margaret Miller claimed that her male supervisor 
"promised her a better job if she would be sexually 'cooperative' and caused her dismissal 
when she refused. "121 Here, Judge Williams questioned "whether Title VII was intended 
to hold an employer liable for what is essentially the isolated and unauthorized sex 
misconduct of employee to another. "128 The judge further reasoned that the employer 
would not be liable for the supposed actions as there was no company policy which 
"imposes or permits a consistent, as distinguished from isolated, sex-based discrimination 
on a definable employee group. "129 
RECOGNITION OF A VIOLATION 
The first case to establish sexual harassment as sex discrimination is found in 
Williams v Sax.be. 130 Initially, the circumstances surrounding the plaintiffs charges were 
handled through an internal hearing. When brought to court, two issues arose for 
decision. The court attempted to resolve (1) whether retaliatory actionrn by the plaintiff's 
126418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976). 
121/d. at 234. 
129/d. at 236. 
130413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976). 
131/d. at 655-656. (Plaintiff contended that following her refusal of her supervisor's 
sexual advances, he "engaged in a continuing pattern and practice of harassment and 
humiliation of her, including but not limited to, unwarranted reprimands, refusal to 
inform her of matters for the performance of her responsibilities, refusal to consider her 
proposals and recommendations, and refusal to recognize her as a competent professional 
in her field."). 
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supervisor, based on the plaintiff's rejection of the supervisor's sexual advances, 
constituted a violation of Title VII and (2) the manner in which the court should review 
the findings in the administrative record. The court squarely rejected the defendant's 
claim that there was no cause of action because the alleged behavior was not a company 
policy. While noting that a factual determination regarding company policy as opposed 
to individual action was necessary, the court did state that "if this was a policy or 
practice of plaintiff's supervisor, then it was the agency's policy or practice, which is 
prohibited by Title VII. "132 The court rendered judgement for the plaintiff, although on 
appeal the case was remanded for trial de novo, consistent with the provisions of Title 
VII. 
Following the district court's ruling in the Williams case, the appellate court began 
to rule more favorably for victims of sexual harassment. In its per curiam decision in 
Garber v Saxon Business Products, 133 the court reversed the district judge's order for 
dismissal based on lack of cause. Stating that "the complaint and its exhibits, liberally 
construed, allege an employer policy or acquiescence in a practice of compelling female 
employees to submit to the sexual advances of their male supervisors in violation of Title 
VII. 11134 The case, therefore, was remanded for further proceedings. 
132/d. at 660. 
133552 F.2d. 1032 (4th Cir. 1977). 
134/d. 
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The District of Columbia Circuit, in Barnes v Castle, 135 overturned the district 
court's dismissal of Barnes v Train. 136 Circuit Judge Robinson contended that, 
" ... she became the target of her supervisor's sexual desires because she was a woman, 
and was asked to bow to his demands as a price for holding her job. "137 Following a 
review of the legislative histories of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its 1972 
amendments concerning sex discrimination, the court concluded that "it is much too late 
in the day to contend that Title VII does not outlaw terms of employment for women 
which differ appreciably from those set for men, and which are not genuinely and 
reasonably related to pedormance on the job. "138 
The Third Circuit, in Tomkins v Public Service Electric & Gas Co. 139 outlined the 
two elements necessary to state a cause of action for sexual harassment under Title VII. 
Accepting the facts established as true, the court found that Appellant Tomkins was forced 
to acquiesce to the sexual demands of her superior as a condition of employment. 
Secondly, this condition of employment was based on sex. Holding this as a violation of 
Title VII, the court found for the appellant and remanded the case for additional 
proceedings. 
The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of sexual harassment in the appeal of Miller 
135561 F.2d. 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
136Supra at note 121. 
137561 F .2d at 990. 
138/d. at 989-990. 
139568 F.2d. 1044 (3rd Cir. 1977). 
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v Bank of America. 140 Rejecting the lower court's opinion that the Defendant-Appellee 
Bank of America should not be held liable for the sexual harassment by one of its 
supervisors because of the plaintiff-appellant's failure to use the company grievance 
procedure, the court ruled that, " while Congress has established certain preconditions to 
suit, it has not established use of the employers personnel procedures as such a 
precondition. 11141 
EEOC GUIDELINES 
In April, 1980, the EEOC announced that it would amend its Guidelines on sex 
discrimination in order to "re-affirm that sexual harassment is an unlawful employment 
practice. "142 Of the numerous letters received during the public comment period, the 
majority of remarks concerned § 1604.11 (c) which established employer liability for 
sexual harassment. 143 
Disagreeing with the contention that "liability under this section is too broad and 
140600 F.2d. 211 (9th Cir. 1979). 
141ld. at 214. 
14245 Fed. Reg. 25,024 (1980). 
14\Jnder § 1604.ll{c) "an employer is responsible for its acts and those of its agents 
and supervisory employees with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether the 
specific acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the employer and 
regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known of their occurrence." 
unsupported by case law, "144 the EEOC stated that: 
[T]he strict liability imposed in§ 1604.1 l(c) is in keeping with the general 
standard . . . the Commission and the courts have held for years that an 
employer is liable if a supervisor or an agent violates Title VII, regardless 
of knowledge or any other mitigating factor. 145 
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For some, the Guidelines represented a concerted effort to eliminate sexual harassment 
from the workplace. 146 Others, however, disagreed. 147 In response to the controversy, 
then Vice-Chairman of the EEOC, Daniel Leach, stated: 
Sexual harassment was an issue in the workplace long before the 
Commission issued its voluntary guidelines . . . the EEOC was late in 
getting into the fray ... [E]mployers don't like knowing that they are 
liable for these kind of things and they point the finger at the EEOC, but 
14445 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980). 
146See, e.g., Ledgerwood & Johnson-Dietz, The EEOC's Bold Foray into Sexual 
Harassment on the Job: New Implications for Employer Liability, 33 Ind. Rel. Research 
A. 55, 61 (1980) ("Sexual harassment undermines the integrity of the workplace. The 
courts as well as the EEOC recognize this as a reality and appear determined to extirpate 
sexual harassment from the American workplace."); Martin, EEOC's New Sexual 
Harassment Guidelines: Civility in the Workplace, 5 Nova L.J. 405, 418 (1981) ("With 
its guidelines on sexual harassment, EEOC takes a large step toward making us aware that 
sexual harassment is a persistent problem."). 
147William Knapp, labor law attorney for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, argued that 
the Guidines go "beyond the reach of the law to cover interpersonal relationships," and 
serve only to confuse the issue of liability. 120 Empl. Prac. Rep. (CCH) (October 10, 
1980).; See, also, Karnes, Sexual Harassment: New Guidelines, New Cases, New 
Problems, 7 EEO Today 159, 160 (1980) ("[I]t is not very comforting that guidelines 
would confer absolute liability on the employer for discriminatory acts of supervisors 
regardless of whether the employer knew of the supervisor's acts."). 
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I suggest that they are wrong. It is the courts who have made this 
. d t 148 JU gmen. 
JUDICIAL RESPONSE 
The idea of hostile work environment sexual harassment as a violation of Title VII 
reached the D.C. Circuit in Bundy v Jackson. 149 Here, the court held that the violation 
of the sex discrimination prohibition includes a hostile work environment based on sexual 
harassment which "follows ineluctably from numerous cases finding Title VII violations 
where an employer created or condoned a substantially discriminatory work environment, 
regardless of whether the complaining employees lost any tangible benefits. "150 In 
remanding the case to the lower court, Judge Wright suggested that the Guidelines be 
used as a reference in determining relief to the plaintiff. Noting that the "goal of the 
Guidelines is preventive, "151 the court should help "ensure that such corrective action 
never becomes necessary. "152 
The Eleventh Circuit fully elaborated on the distinction between a hostile 
environment claim of sexual harassment and those claims considered "quid pro quo" 
harassment. In Henson v City of Dundee153 the plaintiff charged that she was the victim 
1~ureau of National Affairs, Sexual Harassment and Labor Relations (1981) at 6. 
14~4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
150/d. at 1160 (citing Rogers v EEOC, 454 F .2d at 238). 
151/d. at 1161. 
153682 F.2d. 897 (11th Cir. 1982). 
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of both hostile environment1s4 and quid pro quo harassment. iss In its ruling on the hostile 
environment claim, the court found that ". . . a requirement that a man or woman run a 
gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a 
living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets. "156 
When addressing the issue of "quid pro quo" harassment, the court defined it as 
a situation in which "the supervisor relies upon his apparent or actual authority to extort 
sexual consideration from an employee. "157 Testimony and evidence presented at the 
district level caused the Circuit Court to rule that Plaintiff Henson did in fact suffer the 
loss of a tangible job benefit (attendance at the police academy) for her refusal of a sexual 
relationship with her supervisor. 
The Henson decision is also important in that it delineated those circumstances 
under which an employer is held liable for the sexual harassment of its supervisor. In 
the charge of hostile environment harassment, the court found that the employer should 
not be liable because "the capacity of any person to create a hostile or offensive 
environment is not necessarily enhanced or diminished by any degree of authority which 
154/d. at 899.Plaintiff contends that she and a coworker were "subjected [them] to 
numerous harangues of demeaning sexual inquiries and vulgarities throughout the course 
of the two years "and that her supervisor "repeatedly requested that she have sexual 
relations with him." 
15'Plaintiff alleged that she, unlike male coworkers, was denied the benefit of attending 
the police academy solely because she refused a sexual relationship with her supervisor. 
156/d. at 902. 
157/d. at 910. 
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the employer confers upon that individual. "158 In determining employer liability for the 
"quid pro quo" harassment the court upheld the respondeat superior59 theory of liability. 
Here, the court held that in denying Henson the benefit of attending the police academy, 
her supervisor "act[ed] within at least the apparent scope of the authority entrusted to him 
by the employer [and] his conduct can fairly be imputed to the source of his authority. "1110 
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION 
It was in the October, 1985 term that the Supreme Court agreed to hear the matter 
of sexual harassment. The decision reached by the Court in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB 
v Vinson 161 is at once both gratifying and "as troubling as sexual harassment itself. "162 
While the Court firmly established both quid pro quo and hostile work environment 
sexual harassment violations of Title VII, its reasoning in the case raised as many 
questions as it attempted to answer. 163 
159/d., at 909. The court stated that "in a typical Title VII case, an employer is held 
liable for the discriminatory acts of its supervisors which affect the tangible benefits of 
an employee. See, also, Sparks v Pilot Freight Carriers, 830 F.2d. 1554 (11th. Cir. 
1987); Schroeder v Schock, 42 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 1112 (D. Kans. 1986). 
160/d. at 910. 
161106 S.Ct. 2399 (1986). 
162Dodier, Meritor Savings Bank v Vinson: Sexual Harassment at Work, 10 Harv. 
Women's L.J. 203, 205 (1987). 
163The Court definitively answered four questions: (1) hostile work environment sexual 
harassment is as much a violation of Title VII as "quid pro quo" harassment; (2) the 
standard under which a hostile environment claim is actionable depends upon the severity 
and pervasiveness of the sexual harassment; (3) evidence of a plaintiff's speech or dress 
is not inadmissible; (4) policies against and grievance procedures for sexual harassment 
do not shield the employer from liability. Left unanswered were the following: ( 1) how 
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When this case was first presented in district court, 164 the following facts were 
established and credited: . Plaintiff, Mechelle Vinson, was hired by Defendant, Sidney 
Taylor, in early September, 1974. Thereafter, and through September, 1978, Vinson 
received three promotions "based solely on her merit as an employee. "165 Vinson took an 
extended leave of absence beginning in September 1978 and was dismissed on November 
1, 1978 for excessive use of sick time. This action was brought by Vinson against Taylor 
and the employer for violations of Title VII. Unresolved at trial were Vinson's allegations 
that Taylor began making sexual advances towards her starting in May, 1975 and 
continuing through September, 1977 .166 Taylor denied all allegations against him, 
claiming they were made in response to a separate, unrelated business dispute. The bank 
disclaimed any liability, arguing that even if the sexual advances were made, the bank 
neither approved nor knew of such activities. 
The district court concluded that Vinson was not the victim of either sexual 
harassment or sex discrimination. That Vinson suffered no loss of economic benefit 
negated her claim under Title VII. In addition, the court reasoned that "if the plaintiff 
and Taylor did engage in a sexual relationship during the time of plaintiff's employment 
does a plaintiff prove the conduct was unwelcome?; (2) what evidence of plaintiff's 
speech or dress is relevant to the question of unwelcomeness?; (3) what is the rule on 
employer liability? 
1~3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 37 (D.C. 1980). 
165/d. at 38. 
16Vinson contends that during this period, Taylor fondled her in front of co-workers, 
had intercourse with her between 40 and 50 times and forcibly raped her on more than 
one occasion. 
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with Capital, that relationship was a voluntary one. "167 
On appeal, 168 the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the lower court decision 
for its failure to address the issue of hostile work environment sexual harassment. Citing 
its earlier ruling in Bundy, the Court of Appeals found that Vinson was indeed the victim 
of sex discrimination under Title VII. The court further held that the district judge erred 
in allowing testimony regarding Vinson's sexual fantasies and dress, matters which "had 
no place in this litigation. 11169 The appellate decision also looked to the Guidelines issued 
by the EEOC and found the bank, as the employer, liable for the violations committed 
by Taylor. In accord with its decision, the case was remanded for further proceedings. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1985, after a rehearing en banc110 was 
denied. Relying on prior decisions regarding hostile environment based on race, 111 
religion, 112 and national origin173 the Court stated that "nothing in Title VII suggests that 
a hostile environment based on discriminatory sexual harassment should not be likewise 
161/d. at 42. The court's conclusion that the relationship was a voluntary one was based 
on the fact that participation had nothing to do with Vinson's continued employment or 
promotions at the bank. 
168753 F.2d. 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
169/d. at 146. 
11°760 F.2d 1330 (1985). 
111Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality v St. Louis, 549 F.2d. 506 (8th Cir.). 
112compston v Borden, Inc., 424 F.Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976). 
173Cariddi v Kansas City Chiefs Football Club,568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1977). 
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prohibited. 11174 The Court also deferred to the EEOC Guidelines which held both quid pro 
quo and hostile environment sexual harassment as violations of Title VII. 
Cautioning that not all behavior described as harassment gives rise to a Title VII 
claim, the Court rejected the district court's view of voluntariness and referred to the 
Guidelines' requirement of 'unwelcomeness.' To determine whether alleged behavior is 
welcome or not, the Guidelines call for an investigation of "the context in which the 
alleged incidents occurred. "175 Based on this criteria, the Supreme Court disagreed with 
the circuit court and held that testimony regarding the "complainants sexually provocative 
speech or dress ... is obviously relevant. "176 
On the question of employer liability, the Court said that it would "decline the 
parties' invitation to issue a definitive rule. "177 In making this decision, the Court turned 
away from the EEOC Guidelines and looked instead to the amicus brief filed by the 
Commission. Here, the Solicitor General argued that the employer should be held 
responsible for the sexual harassment by it supervisor's when that supervisor is acting 
174106 S.Ct. at 2405. 
11si9 C.F.R. 1604. ll(b). 
176106 S.Ct. at 2406. 
177/d. at 2408. 
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within the scope of his authority. 178 The Guidelines, however, do not place this limitation 
on liability. Rather, the Guidelines hold that "an employer . . . is responsible for its acts 
and those of its agents and supervisory employees with respect to sexual harassment 
regardless of whether the specific acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden 
by the employer and regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known of 
their occurrence. "179 
Although he concurred with the majority opinion in the Meritor case, Justice 
Marshall stated that "the Solicitor General's position is untenable. "180 In Marshall's view, 
this case should utilize "the same rules we apply in all other Title VII cases, and hold that 
sexual harassment by a supervisor of an employee under his supervision, leading to a 
discriminatory work environment, should be imputed to the employer for Title VII 
purposes regardless of whether the employee gave 'notice' of the offense. "181 
178Supervisors not acting within the scope of their authority may be held personally 
liable for discriminatory actions. See, e.g. ,Kyriazi v Western Electric Co., 476 F. Supp. 
35 (D. N.J. 1979); For related articles on this subject, see, generally, Munchus, Personal, 
Legal Liability of Managers Under Employment Discrimination Law: Some Historical Case 
Obsavations, 3 Acad. Mgmt Exec. 246 (1989); Axford, Personal Liability of Personnel 
Managers, 11 Empl. Rel. Today 86 (1984). 
11929 C.F.R. 1604. ll(c). 
180106 S.Ct. at 2410. 
181/d. at 2411. Justice Marshall's opinion was similar to that invoked by Members of 
Congress in its amicus brief. Here, the Committee on Education and Labor suggested that 
the employer be held liable for sexual harassment under the same legal standards as racial, 
ethnic or religious harassment. See, generally, Brief of Amici Curaie Members of 
Congress in Support of Respondent, Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson, 106 S.Ct. 
2399 (1986) (No. 84-1979). 
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Both the Supreme Court's reasoning and the EEOC's position in the Meritor case 
presented many questions. First, the EEOC, concerned with the notion that "sexual 
attraction is a fact of life, and it may often play a role in the day-to-day social exchange 
between employees in the workplace, "182 has erroneously likened 'attraction' to 
'harassment'. This is the same argument used by the district court in Miller v Bank of 
America, where it dismissed the Plaintiff's Title VII claim on the theory that "the 
attraction of males to females ... is a natural sex phenomenon and it is probable that this 
attraction plays at least a subtle part in most personnel decisions. "183 
Second, the EEOC created new standards for employer liability "in some 
tension" 184 with its Guidelines. This poses yet another issue for the court system to 
address in sexual harassment cases. While no unequivocal endorsement of the EEOC's 
position was rendered, the Supreme Court suggested that courts look to agency 
principles185 in determining whether a supervisor acted within or outside the scope of his 
employment. Thus, an employer may be relieved of liability for sexual harassment even 
though a cause of action has been recognized. By providing an avenue for exceptions to 
182Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as 
Amici Curaie, Meritor Savings Bank FSB v Vinson, 106 S.Ct. 2399 (1986), (No. 84-
1979) at 13. 
183418 F.Supp at 236, rev'd 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979). See, Anderson, Employer 
Liability under Title VII for Sexual Harassment after Meritor Savings Bank v Vinson, 87 
Colum. L. Rev. 1266-68 (1987). 
184106 S.Ct. at 2408. 
185/d. ; For a detailed discussion of the application of agency principles, see R. Baxter, 
Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Guide to the Law, 49-57. (1989). 
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employer liability for sexual harassment under Title Vil, the Court and the EEOC run the 
"risk [of] frustrating its purpose. "186 
Finally, throughout the history of Title Vil litigation, courts have continually 
likened sex discrimination cases to race discrimination cases. 187 While acknowledging that 
sexual harassment is a violation of Title Vil, the Supreme Court held that "the gravamen 
of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome'"188 
This additional burden of proof placed on the plaintiff is inconsistent with racial 
harassment cases in that courts have held that racial harassment is presumptively 
offensive. While both race and sex are established as prohibited categories of 
discrimination, "as a whole, courts have applied higher, more exacting standards when 
analyzing sexual harassment claims. "189 
While the concerns expressed regarding the Meritor decision warrant 
consideration, it is equally important to note that the Guidelines issued by the EEOC do 
186vhay, The Harms in Asking: Towards a Comprehensive Treatment of Sexual 
Harassment, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 345 (1988). 
187The analogy between race and sex discrimination is seen in Supreme Court decisions 
in Dothard v Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 32 (1977) citing Griggs v Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 
(1971) and Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson, 106 S.Ct. 2399 (1986) citing Rogers 
v EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, cen. denied 406 U.S. 957 (1972). 
188106 S.Ct. at 2406. 
189See, Stanley-Elliot, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Title VII's Impeifect 
Relief, 6 J. Corp. L. 655 (1981). 
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not have the force of law. While the Supreme Court will give "great deference" 19<\o 
EEOC Guidelines, "deference must have its limits where ... application of the 
guidelines would be inconsistent with an obvious congressional intent ... [c]ourts need 
not defer to an administrative construction of a statute where there are 'compelling 
indications that it is wrong.' "191 As noted in Meritor, the lack of a solid legislative history 
regarding sex discrimination192 makes a determination of congressional intent virtually 
impossible. In addition, the Guidelines on sex discrimination, which attribute strict 
liability to the employer, are inconsistent with " [congressional] intent to place some limits 
on the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held 
responsible. "193 
1~he first opinion specifically endorsing 'great deference' was the concurring opinion 
in Phillips v Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. 542,545 (1971). This was followed by in Griggs 
v Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971). 
191Espinoza v Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973); See, also, General Electric 
Co. v Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976) (Justice Rehnquist noting that Guidelines are 
"not controlling upon the courts ... "). 
192106 S.Ct. at 2404. 
193/d. at 2408. 
CHAPTER V 
JUDICIAL RELIEF FOR CLAIMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
Title VII 
Having judicially and administratively established sexual harassment as a violation 
of Title VII, attention must now focus on the relief available to the successful litigant. 
Section 706(g) of Title VII states that if discrimination has been found: 
[T]he court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful 
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be 
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or 
hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer, 
employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible 
for the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the 
court deems appropriate. 194 
The remedial purpose of Title VII was addressed by the Supreme Court in Albarmarle 
Paper Co. v Moody. 195 Here the Court held: 
19442 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(g); It is important to note that Title VII relief is barred for 
those victims of discrimination who are employed by an employer with less than 15 
employees as defined in § 70l(g); In addition, under the standards evoked in Meritor, 
relief is only available where the employer is found liable for sexual harassment. 
195422 U.S. 405 (1975) 
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[T]he general rule is, that when a wrong has been done, and the law gives 
a remedy, the compensation shall be equal to the injury. The latter is the 
standard by which the former is to be measured. The injured party is to 
be placed, as near as may be, in the situation he would have occupied if 
the wrong had not been committed. 196 
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It is within this framework that the greatest criticism197 of Title VII remedies for claims 
of sexual harassment have been leveled. These criticisms focus not only on the remedies 
expressed in Title VII, but also on the remedies excluded from those available. 19s 
Fundamentally, granting an injunction forbidding the continuation of an unlawful 
employment practice is not without merit. But, in terms of sexual harassment: 
the effectiveness [of an injunction] ... is questionable. It is suggested that 
plaintiffs and defendants are usually not the "best of friends" after a 
lawsuit. But rather, after the termination of a lawsuit, plaintiffs and 
defendants express hostility towards one another. This type of employment 
atmosphere would seem to facilitate verbal abuse or possibly some other 
1. . 199 reta 1atory action. . . . 
196/d. at 418.; See, also, Senate Conference Report on H.R. 1746, 118 Cong. Rec. 
7158 ( 1972) (concerning S 706(g): The provisions of this subsection are intended to give 
the courts wide discretion exercising their equitable powers to fashion the most complete 
relief possible. In dealing with the present section 706(g) the courts have stressed that 
the scope of relief under that section of the Act is intended to make the victims of 
unlawful discrimination whole, and that the attainment of this objective rests not only 
upon the elimination of the particular unlawful employment practice complained of, but 
also requires that persons aggrieved by the consequences and the unlawful employment 
practice be, so far as possible, restored to a position where they would have been were 
it not for the unlawful discrimination.). 
191See infra notes 199-202 and accompanying text. 
19sCompensatory and punitive damages are unavailable in Title VII actions. See infra 
notes 203-204 and accompanying text. 
199Andrews, The Legal and Economic Implications of Sexual Harassment~ 14 N.C. 
Cent. L.J. 113, 142-143 (1983). 
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In addition, the granting of back pay would theoretically benefit only those victims of 
"quid pro quo" harassm~nt who suffered some sort of economic loss as a result of the 
illegal activity. The EEOC defines back pay as,". . . the difference between what [the 
employee] actually earned and what [the employee] would have earned had [the 
employee] been promoted, had [the employee] received the job for which [the employee] 
applied, or had [the employee] not been fired. 11200 An employee aggrieved through hostile 
environment sexual harassment would necessarily have to plead a "quid pro quo" element 
to the harassment in the form of tangible economic injury. 
Finally, the practicality of reinstatement in cases of sexual harassment is open to 
debate. Similar to the argument against injunctive relief, commentators have noted that, 
" ... the advantages of returning to the prior harassing worksite are questionable. 11201 
The dubious nature of reinstatement to a hostile environment have also been explored in 
the Fair Employment Practices Manual, 202 although no specific reference to sexual 
harassment is made. 
~ureau of National Affairs, Fair Employment Practices Compliance Manual, 
431 :315 at 91 (1989). 
201Dworkin, Ginger & Mallor, Theories of Recovery for Sexual, Harassment: Going 
Beyorui Title VII, 25 San Diego L. Rev. 125,131 (1988); See, a/,so, Mays v Wiilamson, 
591 F. Supp. 1518 (E.D. Ark. 1984) (the court doubting reinstatement was a proper 
remedy due to hostility in the workplace). But, see, EEOC v Domino's Pizza, Inc., 34 
Fair Empt. Prac. Cases (BNA) 1075 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (court ordered reinstatement 
where offending supervisor was no longer with the company). 
WSureau of National Affairs, Fair Employment Practices Manual,431 :355-357 at 114 
("Excessive friction or antagonism between the complainant and company supervisors, 
officials, or fellow employees may be an exceptional circumstance precluding 
reinstatement."). 
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COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
The second objection to relief under Title VII stems from the fact that 
compensatory and punitive damages are unavailable to the prevailing party. This 
compensatory insufficiency is particularly noteworthy in cases of sexual harassment. The 
absence of compensatory damages, aimed at providing retribution for pain and suffering, 
emotional distress and the like, has lead one court to conclude that " [r]einstatement, 
back pay and injunctions vindicate the rights of the victimized group without 
compensating the plaintiff for such personal injuries as anguish, physical symptoms of 
stress, a sense of degradation, and the cost of psychiatric care. "203 
Punitive damages, intended to punish the wrongdoer, are also unavailable in Title 
VII litigation. Regardless of whether or not an employer is found liable for sexual 
harassment, "the absence of any potential monetary recovery discourages harassment 
victims from bringing Title VII actions . . . for no tangible reward other than a judicial 
'slap on the hand'. "204 
TORT REMEDIES 
Statutory authority for a state cause of action is granted in Section 708 of Title 
VII. Here, Congress unequivocally declared that: 
203Holien v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 137 (Or. 1984); 
See, also, Stewart v Thomas, 538 F.Supp. 891, 897 (D.D.C. 1982) ("to the extent that 
Title VII fails to capture the personal nature of the injury done to the plaintiff as an 
individual, the remedies provided by the statute fail appreciate the relevant dimensions 
of the problem in this case."). 
~ymer, Compensatory and Punitive Damages for Sexual Harassment, 183 Personnel 
Journal 181, 181 (1983). 
Nothing in this title shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from 
any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or 
future law of any State or political subdivision of a State, other than any 
such law which purports to require or permit the doing of any act which 
would be an unlawful employment practice under this title. 205 
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According to one commentator, "[t]ort law is particularly suited for sexual 
harassment cases, as it is a flexible and evolving doctrine: a court may allow a tort action 
even if the particular cause of action has not been recognized before. 11206 To that end, 
complaints have been filed under a variety of theories such as assault and battery, w1 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, 208 intrusion209 and interference with contract. 210 
The difficulty in applying a tort claim, however, is threefold. First, though by 
20542 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-7; It is long settled that Title VII does not prevent a claimant 
from seeking relief under other federal laws. See, e.g., Johnson v Railway Express 
Agency, Inc. 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (holding that Title VII and earlier civil rights laws are 
totally distinct causes of action which can be pursued separately); See also, Alexander 
v Gardner-Denver Co. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
~ontgomery, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Practitioner's Guide to Ton 
Actions, 10 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 879, 885 (1980). 
w1See, e.g., Rogers v Loews L'Enfant Plaza Hotel 526 F.Supp. 523 (D.D.C. 1981); 
Skousen v Nidy, 90 Ariz 215(1961). 
208See, e.g., Shaffer v National Can Corp. 565 F.Supp. 909 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Rice 
v United Ins. Co. of America 465 So.2d 1100 (Ala. 1984); Rogers v Loews L'Enfant 
Plaza Hotel 526 F.Supp. 523 (D.D.C. 1981) 
200See, e.g., Phillips v Smalley Maintenance Services, Inc. 425 So.2d 705 (Ala. 1983) 
answering cenified questions at 711 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1983); Rogers v Loews 
L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, 526 F.Supp. 523 (D.D.C. 1981). 
210See, e.g., Guyette v Stauffer Chemical Co., 518 F.Supp. 521 (D.N.J. 1981); 
Kyriazi v Western Electric Co., 461 F.Supp. 894 (D.N.J. 1978). 
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definition211 a tort may have occurred, not all states recognize a cause of action. 212 
Secondly, the question of diversity jurisdiction213 must be resolved. Finally, if a tort 
claim is attached to a claim under Title VII, pendent jurisdiction214 must be settled. 
Like Title VII, tort remedies for claims of sexual harassment are not above 
reproach. A very basic argument is that plaintiffs should not have to rely on state remedy 
211See, generally, Restatement (Second) of Torts ( 1965). The definition of assault is 
provided in S 21 (actor intended to cause harmful or offensive physical contact and victim 
was apprehensive of the same); S 31 defines battery as a harmful or offensive contact 
offensively caused; S 46(1) declares that "[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct 
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability 
for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such 
bodily harm." (The standard of judgment for emotional distress is provided in comment 
d which states that, "Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an 
average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and 
lead him to exclaim, 'Outrageous!'); S 766 indicates the liability for interference with 
contract as "One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a 
contract . . . between another and a third person by . . . causing the third person not to 
perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for pecuniary loss resulting ... " 
212See, e.g., Spencer v General Electric Co., 1989 U.S. App. Lexis 561 (4th Circuit 
dismissed claim of invasion of privacy and negligent supervision as these tort claims 
were not viable under Virginia law); Cummings v Walsh Construction Co., 561 F.Supp 
872 (S.D. Ga. 1983) (claim of intrusion dismissed for lack of proof that conduct was not 
wanted, invited, or warranted as required by state law ) . 
213ln Rogers, supra at note 207, the court upheld a cause of action for a claim of 
$500,000 in the belief that even though the monetary damages sought may not have been 
awarded, there was a degree of 'judicial certainty' that the actual award would meet the 
statutory minimum of $10,000. 526 F. Supp. at 532. 
214In combining a federal Title VII claim with a state tort claim, the federal district 
court must determine if the claim is derived from a common set of facts, if the federal 
claim has sufficient substance and if the combined claims constitute a single cause of 
action. See, generally, Schlei and Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law (2d ed., 
1983 and 1989 Five-Year Cumulative Supplement) for a listing of those federal courts 
which have/have not allowed pendent claims. 
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when a federal statute exists. 215 Second, within the tort remedies used, various limitations 
preclude true effectiveness. For example, battery claims exist when the offensive contact 
is a single event, and sexual harassment is often a recurring activity. 216 Claims for assault 
"provides a specific remedy only for those damages that result directly from a specific 
instance of assault. "211 In charges argued under intentional infliction of emotional distress 
the conduct must be extreme and outrageous, neither of which are clearly defined. In 
addition, the court needs to believe that the harasser intended to harm the victim. 218 
When arguing interference with contract, wrongful discharge may not apply to employees 
at will. 219 
SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVES 
It has been argued that "Title VII and tort law together fail to meet the human 
215Bratton, The Eye of the Beho/,der: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Law and 
Social Research on Sexual Harassment, 17 N.M.L. Rev. 91, 106 (1987): "First, plaintiffs 
should not have to depend on the availability of favorable state law to recover punitive 
or other compensatory damages for violations of a right created by federal statute. 
Second, tort law allows recovery only from the primary tortfeasor. This limitation runs 
counter to the language of Title VII which places responsibility of the employer for the 
maintenance of a nondiscriminatory work environment." 
216Note, Legal Remedies for Claims of Employment-Related Sexual Harassment, 64 
Minn. L. Rev. 151, 168 n.14 (1979). 
211/d. emphasis added. 
219See, generally, W. Holloway and M. Leech, Employment Termination: Rights and 
Remedies (1985), at 195. 
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need for certainty in the law. "220 Given these apparent drawbacks, several commentators 
have suggested altemativ.es to correct these weaknesses in the law. Most emphasis has 
been given to separating sexual harassment from the general Title VII prohibition against 
sex discrimination, and enacting federal legislation strictly dealing with this issue. 221 
Others have recommended that "Congress should amend title [sic] VII to allow 
for comprehensive remedies tailored to the injuries suffered by victims -- remedies 
including compensatory damages -- if sexual harassment in the workplace is to be 
remedied and deterred. "222 Short of this, it is suggested that in claims argued under Title 
VII, courts should adopt a 'reasonable victim' viewpoint when they try to determine a 
standard of credibility. 223 Finally, acknowledging the restrictions in tort law, it has been 
suggested that a separate tort of sexual harassment become recognized. 224 
220Comment, 10 Cap. U. L. Rev. 611 (1981). 
221See, e.g., Comment, 10 Capital University Law Review (Spring, 1981): ("A more 
direct and effective approach would separate sexual harassment from the more general 
category of sex discrimination and attempt to pass federal laws solely against sexual 
harassment."); 48 Ohio State Law Journal 1151, 1164 (1987): ("A federal statute would 
assure uniformity . . . would affect every employer in the country . . . would leave no 
questions in the minds of employers as to the seriousness of the problem and commitment 
of lawmakers to crafting a solution."). But see, 64 Minnesota Law Review 151, 180 
(November, 1979): (arguing against a federal statute because sexual harassment does not 
" . . . engender a high level of opprobrium from all strata of society."). 
222Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 
Harv. L. Rev. 1449, 1467 (1984). 
223Attanasio, Equal Justice Under Chaos: The Developing Law of Sexual Harassment, 
51 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 22 n. 145 (1982). 
224Comment, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 134 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1461, 1485-1495 (1988). 
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To date, none of these suggested alternatives have been realized. If the arguments 
that Title VII and tort law are insufficient remedies for claims of sexual harassment225 are 
accepted, relief should be sought under other available statutes. The remainder of this 
thesis will examine the federal RICO law as a possible alternative. 
225See infra notes 199-220 and accompanying text. 
Chapter VI 
RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS225 
BACKGROUND 
Government concern with organized crime is a matter of public record. In 1951, 
Estes Kefauver (D. TN) headed the Senate Special Committee to Investigate Organized 
Crime in Interstate Commerce.226 In 1958, John McClellan (D. Ark) led the Senate Select 
Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field. 221 Again, in 1965, 
McClellan directed the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate 
Committee on Government Operations, Organized Crime and Illicit Traffic in Narcotics. 228 
In 1967, the Task Force on Organized Crime, part of the President's Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, issued a report analyzing the nature and scope 
225 18 u.s.c. § 1961-1968 (1982). 
226See S. Rep. 307, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess (1951). 
221See S. Rep. 1417, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1958); S. Rep. 621, 86th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1959); S. Rep. 1139, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1960). 
228See S. Rep. 72, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). 
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. d . 229 of orgamze cnme. 
Consistent with his opposition to organized crime, McClellan introduced Senate 
Bill 30,(S. 30) The Organized Crime Control Act, (OCCA) to the 9lst Congress on 
January 15, 1969.230 Hearings were held on March 18, 19, 25, 26, and again on June 3 
and 4, 1969, 231 on organized crime and other anti-crime proposals232 pending in the Senate. 
In his opening remarks, McClellan explained, "[T]he (crime] situation is so critical in my 
judgment that today it is incumbent upon the Congress of the United States to provide 
every legal tool within the framework of the Constitution that can be made available to 
our law enforcement officials to combat organized crime. "233 
To spur action on S. 30, President Nixon sent a message to Congress outlining the 
necessity of combatting organized crime and its infiltration into legitimate business. 
Referring to the OCCA, Nixon stated that, "it is designed to improve the investigation 
and prosecution of organized crime cases, and to provide appropriate sentencing for 
2~esident's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task 
Force Report: Organized Crime, (1967). 
230116 Cong. Rec. 769 (1969). 
231See, generally, Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Criminal l.Aws and Procedure, Committee on the Judiciary, United 
States Senate, 9lst Cong.,lst Sess., 1969. 
232Jn addition to McClellan's bill, eight additional bills were proposed during the 
Senate hearings: S. 974, S. 975, S. 976 were introduced by Joseph Tydings (D. MD); 
S. 1623, S.1624 and S. 2022 were introduced by Roman Hruska (R. Neb); S.1861 and 
S 2122 were introduced by McClellan. See, generally, 1969 Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac at 699. 
233Hearings, supra at note 221, 86. 
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convicted offenders. I feel confident that it will be a useful new tool. "234 
It was not until mid-December, 1969, however, that the OCCA was reported with 
amendments. 235 As reported, the bill contained ten titles, with provisions ranging from 
grand jury powers to witness protection programs. With a final vote of 73-1 the Senate 
gave overwhelming approval to S. 30.236 
On January 26, 1970, the OCCA was referred to the House Committee on the 
Judiciary. Support for the legislation was not as great as in the Senate. 237 Accordingly, 
hearings on the measure were delayed until the end of May, 1970, and continued 
sporadically through the end of July, 1970. Finally, on September 30, the Judiciary 
Committee favorably reported S. 30 with amendments, "but the bill was reported only 
after the Committee had been warned that if [it] were not reported, it would be forced out 
by a discharge petition. "238 
In their dissent, Representatives Conyers (D. Mich), Mikva (D. IL) and Ryan (D. 
NY) claimed that this legislation was trying to seek easy answers to difficult questions. 
"Never," they stated, "has a bill masqueraded under false pretenses more than the 
23Tub. Papers, Richard Nixon, April 23, 1969, 320-321. 
235s. Rep. 617. 
236116 Cong. Rec. 972 (1970). 
237Emanuel Celler (D. NY.) referred to a report from the ABA labelling the bill 
'repressive' and questioned the Constitutionality of the bill. See, generally, 1970 
Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 545. 
238/d. at 552. 
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Organized Crime Control Act. "239 In spite of these objections, the House passed S 30 by 
a vote of 341 - 26.240 
When finally enacted, the OCCA had as its stated purpose, "to seek the eradication 
of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence 
gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced 
sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in 
organized crime. "241 
Elements of a RICO Offense242 
Title IX of the OCCA, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 243 created 
a new chapter in the United States criminal code.244 Under the law, it would be illegal 
for a person to use the proceeds from a pattern of racketeering activity to invest in, 245 
23~ Cong. and Admin. News (1970), 4091; In addition, they argued that although the 
bill purports to deter organized crime, no definition of organized crime was included in 
the legislation. Saying that the bill was "pregnant with the potential for abuse . . 
it is more likely to catch poachers and prostitutes than pushers and pimps." 
2401970 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vote, 68-H. 
24184 Stat 923 ( 1970). 
242See, generally, G. Robert Blakey and Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and 
Corropt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts Criminal and Civil Remedies 53 Temp. 
L.Q. 1007 (1980) and Jeff Atkinson, Racketeer Influenced and Corropt Organizations: 
Broadest of the Federal Criminal Statutes, 69 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1 (1978). 
243 18 u.s.c. § 1961-1968 (1982). 
244g4 Stat 923 (1970) adds Chapter 96 to 18 U.S.C. 
245 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (a) (1982) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, 
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control246 or conduct the business of247 an enterprise. Conspiring to commit any of these 
offenses is also illegal. 248 
The broad reach of RICO is seen in the definitions incorporated within the statute. 
Under Section 1961(3), the term person "includes any individual or entity capable of 
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through 
collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a 
principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to 
use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the 
proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the 
establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the 
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of 
securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the 
intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of 
assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the 
securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate 
family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern of racketeering activity 
or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in 
the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, 
and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one more 
directors of the issuer. 
24618 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering 
activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, 
directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is 
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign 
commerce. 
24718 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any 
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign 
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct 
of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or 
collection of unlawful debt. 
24818 U.S.C. § 1962 (d) (1982) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the 
provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section. 
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holding a legal or beneficial interest in property. "249 The definition of enterprise is equally 
sweeping as it "includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association or other 
legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact though not a legal 
entity. "250 Both by design and directive, Congress intended RICO to be "liberally 
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes. "251 
What needed to be remedied is the "highly sophisticated, diversified, and 
widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy, . . 
. the money and power [from which] are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt 
legitimate business. . . . "252 This so-called racketeering activity, defined in Section 
1961(1), includes eight state offenses and over 30 federal offenses.253 What is essential 
249 18 u.s.c. § 1961(3) (1982). 
2SO 18 u.s.c. 1961(4) (1980). 
251§ 904(a), Title IX, Pub. L. No. 452. 
25284 Stat 923, Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose ( 1970). 
25318 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1989 Supp.) defines "racketeering activity" as: 
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, 
robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous 
drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment 
for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the 
following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 ... section 
224 ... sections 471, 472, and 473 . . . section 659 ... if the act indictable 
under section 659 is felonious . . . section 664 . . . sections 891-894 ... 
section 1029 ... section 1084 ... section 1341 ... section 1343 ... sections 
1461-1465 ... section 1503 ... section 1510 ... section 1511 ... section 
1512 ... section 1513 ... section 1951 ... section 1952 ... section 1953 ... 
section 1954 ... section 1955 ... section 1956 ... section 1957 ... section 
1958 ... sections 2251-2252 ... sections 2312 and 2313 ... sections 2314 
and 2315 ... section 2321 ... sections 2341-2346 ... sections 2421-24; (C) 
any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 
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to establish a violation of the RICO law is that the racketeering activity is conducted in 
a pattern. Statutory definition states that a pattern "requires at least two acts of 
racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and 
the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after 
the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity. "254 
CIVIL PROVISIONS 
Under Section l964(c), 
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of 
section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United 
States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and 
the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. "255 
The Supreme Court's ruling in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v Imrex Co., Inc. 256 is important for a 
number of reasons. Here, the Court addressed the issues of standing to sue under Section 
1964(c), and the requirement of a prior criminal conviction. Though not presented to the 
Court, the issue of 'pattern of racketeering' was addressed. 
In 1979, a Belgian corporation, Sedima, entered into a joint venture agreement 
with respondent, Imrex, to obtain electronic components for a second Belgian firm . 
... or section 50l(c); (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a 
case under title 1 l, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious 
manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling or 
otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under 
any law of the United States, or (E) any act which is indictable under the 
Currency and Foreign Transaction Reporting Act; 
254 18 u.s.c. § 1961(5) (1982). 
255 18 U.S.C. 1964(c) (1982). 
256105 S.Ct. 3275 (1985). 
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Convinced that Imrex had overstated its bills, thus cheating Sedima out of its share of 
profits, Sedima filed suit .in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York. In addition to various common-law claims, Sedima asserted RICO claims against 
Jmrex and two of its officers, alleging violations of Section 1962(c), based on the 
racketeering acts of mail and wire fraud. The District Court2j7 dismissed the claim for 
failure to state a racketeering injury. On appeal, the Second Circuit, 258affirmed the lower 
court decision. In addition to finding that Sedima had not alleged a racketeering injury, 
the Court of Appeals also found that because the defendants had no prior criminal 
conviction, the RICO claims were invalid. 
The Supreme Court reversed, referring to the language of the RICO statute. 
According to the Court, "[T]he word 'conviction' does not appear in any relevant portion 
of the statute. "259 The Court also rejected the notion of 'racketeering injury' offered by 
the Second Circuit. Rather, the Court held that "the plaintiff has standing if, and can 
recover only to the extent that, he has been injured in his business or property by the 
conduct constituting the violation. "260 
Concerning the idea of 'pattern of racketeering,' Justice White noted "the failure 
257574 F. Supp. 963 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). 
25'741 F.2d. 482 (1984). 
259105 S. Ct at 3280. Additionally, the Court held that although § 1964( c) uses the term 
'violation' this does not imply conviction. 
2001d. at 3285. 
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of Congress and the courts to develop a meaningful concept of pattern. "261 While the 
court did not further clarify the issue, it did look to the statutory definition262 and noted 
that "in common parlance two of anything do not form a 'pattern. '"263 Therefore, based 
on the legislative history of the RICO law, courts would be well advised to look for some 
sort of persistence and connection in the racketeering activity. 264 
The injury to business or property and pattern of racketeering activity 
requirements established by the Supreme Court are particularly important in cases of 
sexual harassment. By its definition265 "quid pro quo" sexual harassment results in a 
tangible job detriment. Courts have been much more likely to rule favorably for plaintiffs 
who are able to demonstrate an injury in the form of lost income. 266 The 'continuity plus 
relationship' requirement necessary to form a pattern is clearly evident in cases of sexual 
261/d. at 3287. 
26218 U.S.C. § 1961(5, supra at note 254, a pattern "requires at least two acts ... " 
263105 S.Ct. at 3285, n. 14. 
264/d. citing S Rep 91-617, "The target of [RICO] is thus not sporadic activity. The 
infiltration of legitimate business normally requires more than one 'racketeering activity' 
and the threat of continuing activity to be effective. It is this factor of continuity plus 
relationship which combines to produce a pattern." In addition, the Court referred to 18 
U.S.C. 3575(e) and quoted: "[C]riminal activity forms a pattern if it embraces the 
criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or 
methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics 
and are not isolated events." 
™Supra at note 40. 
266See irifra notes 297-302 and accompanying text. 
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harassment. The Merit Board survey267 found that most cases of sexual harassment are 
"not just passing events - , most lasted more than a week and many lasted longer than six 
tbs 11268 mon . 
As in claims of employment discrimination under Title VII, courts continually 
look to prior decisions in order to determine the disposition of the litigation at hand. The 
use of RICO in the employment setting deserves attention in order to demonstrate the 
various applications of the law. 
261Supra at note 
™Merit Report, supra at note 44, at 5. 
CHAPTER VII 
RICO IN EMPLOYMENT 
RATIONALE FOR USE 
Being labelled a 'racketeer,' as most of us understand the term is something many 
employers have probably never considered. In recent years, however, the federal 
racketeering law is being used with more frequency as employees add RICO to the list 
of possible remedies for employment disputes. 269 The rationale for doing so is easy to 
ascertain: RICO allows a federal forum, treble damages and attorney's fees to the 
successful litigant. 270 
In light of the 1985 Sedima decision, many employees are suing their employers 
in yet another example of the liberal construction clause271 of RICO. As will be 
demonstrated, however, not all courts are willing to uphold a claim and employees are 
269See infra notes 278-296 and accompanying text. RICO has been used successfully 
in claims for retaliatory discharge, employer fraud and employee benefits. 
2
'
018 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). 
271§ 904(a), Pub. L. No. 452. 
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finding out with equal frequency that "[t]he RICO Treasure Hunt"212 is often not 
rewarding. 
Person/Enterprise Dichotomy 
When a claim under RICO is brought in the employment context it is typically 
argued under Section 1962(c), which makes it "unlawful for any person employed by or 
associated with an enterprise "273 from conducting the affairs of the enterprise through a 
pattern of racketeering activity. Most courts have construed this to mean that the person 
must be distinct from the enterprise. 274 In Roeder v Alpha Industries, Inc. , 275 for example, 
the plaintiff alleged that due to non-disclosure of a bribe by company officials to an 
outside subcontractor, which led to a decline in stock prices, the plaintiff was defrauded. 
Filing a RICO claim under section 1962(c), Roeder named the president, vice president 
and Alpha as the 'person' and these same three plus the outside subcontractor, the outside 
subcontractor's private company and the outside subcontractors employer as the 
enterprise. Because Alpha was named as both the person and the enterprise the court 
dismissed the claim. As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals noted, " we would not take 
seriously, in the absence, at least, of very explicit statutory language, an assertion that a 
212Leech, RICO and the Fired Employee: What's New (1989 by Michael J. Leech). 
273 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982). 
274See, e.g., Haroco, Inc. v American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago 
747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1987); Bishop v Corbitt Marine Ways, Inc. 802 F.2d 122 (5th 
Cir. 1986); Bennett v United States Trust Co. 770 F.2d. 308 (2nd Cir. 1985); Rae v 
Union Bank 725 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1984); Bennett v Berg 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 
1982); But see, United States v Hartley 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir. 1982). 
275814 F.2d. 22 (1st. Cir. 1987). 
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defendant could conspire with his right arm, which held, aimed and fired the fatal 
weapon. 
11276 
STANDING TO SUE 
A second condition fundamental to an employment related claim expressed by the 
courts is a standing to sue. Under Section 1964(c), civil remedies are available when a 
"person [is] injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 
••• "
277 The strong emphasis given to this requirement is especially noteworthy in claims 
for retaliatory discharge. 
In Pujol v Shearson/American Express, Inc., 278 the plaintiff alleged that his refusal 
to sign an internal compliance statement indicating he knew of no irregularities in the 
defendant's reporting of securities values was his reason for dismissal. The court held 
that although the defendant's alleged misrepresentations could be considered racketeering 
activity, Pujol was "not a defrauded client or investor and was not the target of any of the 
acts pleaded as 'predicate acts. "279 Citing the Supreme Court rule on standing, 280 the court 
dismissed the plaintiff's claim. 
The 11th Circuit used the same standing requirement expressed in Pujol, when it 
216united States v Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190 (4th Cir. 1982). 
211 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). 
278829 F.2d. 1201 (1st Cir. 1987). 
279/d. at 1205. "Predicate acts" are generally understood to be the racketeering 
violations listed in§ 1961(1). 
280105 S.Ct. at 3285. (A person has standing to sue if they are injured in their business 
or property as a result of the pattern of racketeering activity). 
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ruled in Morast v Lance. 281 Here, plaintiff reported an irregular bank transaction to the 
Comptroller of the Currency, as required by banking laws. Subsequently, the plaintiff was 
fired. The claim stated that Morast was fired because he reported the incident, and 
assisted in the investigation of the conspiracy at the bank. The court, however, dismissed 
the plaintiffs claim, reasoning that "Morast was not fired because he refused to participate 
in the bank's illegal scheme; therefore, Morast's injury, his discharge, did not flow 
directly from the predicate acts, the defendant's banking violations. 11282 Other courts have 
adopted the same rationale expressed in Sedima and these two cases, 283 revealing the strict 
adherence to the 'proximate cause' standard. 
Retaliatory discharge as a violation of RICO was argued successfully in Williams 
v Hall. 284 Here, plaintiffs, Harry Williams and Bill McKay, alleged a conspiracy by the 
defendants to commit RICO offenses. Refusing to participate in the scheme to bribe 
foreign officials and cover up the illegalities was recognized as a RICO violation. The 
court explained its reasoning this way: 
Suppose several racketeers were to decide to take over a construction 
company. Suppose they said, "Let's agree to operate this company in 
281807 F.2d. 926 (1987). 
282/d. at 933. 
283see, e.g., Cullom v Hibernia National Bank, 666 F.Supp 88 (E.D.La. 1987) 
(plaintiff's dismissal for refusal to participate in an inflated loan participation scheme was 
not a RICO violation); Nodine v Textron, 819 F.2d 347 (lst Cir. 1987) (firing an 
employee for reporting customs violations not actionable under RICO); Burdick v 
American Express Co., 677 F.Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (retaliatory discharge for 
complaints regarding failure to properly credit interest and churning transactions is not 
a RICO violation). 
284683 F. Supp. 639 (E.D.Ky. 1988). 
violation of the law. Let's rig bids, bribe officials, intimidate and threaten 
competitors not to bid on jobs and let's travel in interstate commerce to 
accomplish all of this. And, oh yes, let's fire all of the honest employees 
in the company, so we won't have any opposition in accomplishing our 
scheme. "285 
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The court acknowledged the debate over standing in retaliatory discharge cases, yet the 
claims of plaintiffs survived to state a RICO cause of action. The plaintiffs were 
reportedly awarded $43 million and $23 million in damages from the wrongful 
termination. 286 
Employer Fraud 
Employees have brought suit against their employers under various theories of 
fraud, some successful and others not. In Waldo v North American Van Lines, 287 the 
plaintiff, an owner/operator truck driver filed suit against North American claiming to 
have been falsely induced to accept employment. Alleging that the trucking firm over 
recruited and under utilized its workforce, the complaint cited various examples of 
misrepresentation. First, having read an advertisement in the newspaper, the plaintiff 
called the company, requesting and receiving a recruitment brochure. Second, a later 
telephone conversation with the company's agent discussed employee benefits, working 
conditions and the like. Accepting a position, the plaintiff claims that not only was he 
misled in both written and verbal communications regarding the earnings potential, the 
285/d. at 644. 
286Naeve, Racketeering Pena/,ties Apply to Employment Litigation, Personnel J. 113 
(Sept. 1989). 
287669 F. Supp. 722 (W.D.Pa. 1987). 
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company failed to disclose the high turnover rate. The court recognized a pattern of 
fraud. 
A second case allowing a RICO claim is found in Smith v MCI Communications 
Corp. 288 Plaintiff was an account representative for defendant. On numerous occasions 
the defendant did not calculate commissions properly. In addition, credit for new 
accounts was not given to the plaintiff. MCI claimed that the plaintiff failed to allege a 
pattern of racketeering activity. The court, however, did not agree, stating that, 
"Although MCI's acts relate only to a single scheme to deprive Smith of her 
commissions, the acts were themselves separate occurrences, and the scheme, which 
would continue as long as Smith was employed, was open-ended. "289 
A RICO cause of action for fraud was not recognized in Jones v Basldn, Flaherty, 
Elliot and Mannino, P. C. , 290 where plaintiff attached a 1962( c) RI CO violation to his age 
discrimination claim. Fired by his employer law firm, Jones alleged that the defendant 
engaged in several incidents of fraud. As a result of concealing various fee payments put 
in escrow, the plaintiff suffered lower partner profits; non-reporting of certain payouts 
led to reduced capital payouts to the plaintiff as a shareholder; finally, the complaint 
alleges that due to fraudulent K-1 forms from the law firm, the plaintiff faced a future tax 
liability. The court dismissed the RICO counts for a lack of standing, contending that 
although the plaintiff suffered economic losses, they were due to bookkeeping 
288678 F. Supp. 823 (D.Kan. 1987). 
289/d. at 827. 
290670 F. Supp. 597 (W.D.Pa. 1987). 
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improprieties which paralleled the alleged tax fraud activity of the law firm. 291 
Employee Benefits 
Promises of benefits later denied has presented interesting interpretations RICO 
violations from the courts. In McLendon v Continental Group, Inc., 292 the employer had 
a 'magic number' benefit plan for employees who lost their jobs. Under the program, 
employees facing layoffs could still receive benefits if, at the time of layoff, their 
combined ages and years of service was one of two numbers. This plan was negotiated 
with, and part of, their union collective bargaining agreement. By carefully selecting 
employees for layoff, the company was able to deny payments to them. Plaintiffs alleged 
that this scheme both violated BRISA law and constituted RICO infractions. The court 
agreed, holding that: 
Just as fraud exists where an official breaches his or her duty for honest, 
faithful and disinterested services to the public . . . so it may exist where an 
industrial organization breaches its statutory duty not to deprive private 
employees of their pension benefits based upon such employees' status with 
respect to those benefits. 293 
291See also, Penry v Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 662 F.Supp. 792 (E.D.Tex. 1987) 
(plaintiffs contention that his discharge was a scheme to defraud is dismissed. Fired on 
August 6, 1986, the company telephoned and sent a letter to plaintiff confirming the 
discharge. These communications were received on August 14, 1986, which court 
contends would in no way facilitate a scheme in retaliation for filing of OSHA complaint 
and Workers' Compensation claim.); Flowers v Continental Grain Co., 775 F.2d 1051 
(8th Cir. 1985) (claim for fraud due to failure to receive a promised bonus, based on 
alleged manipulation of prices, was not properly pleaded); McBee v IHSS, Inc., 655 
F.Supp. 448 (D.Colo. 1987) (employee-purchaser of company not a victim of pattern of 
RICO violations because misrepresentations of business conditions related to single 
scheme.). 
29W2 F. Supp. 1492 (D.N.J. 1988). 
293/d. at 1508. 
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The court further reasoned that if the plaintiff's were able to prove that the company 
never intended to pay them, this too would constitute a violation of RICO. 
Threats made to thirty-two plaintiffs in Saporito v Combustion Engineering, Inc. 294 
established a pattern of racketeering activity adequate to uphold a RICO claim. Here, 
plaintiffs were told that if they refused to accept a voluntary early separation plan they 
would be laid off. These threats were made in spite of the fact that other employees were 
told that a better plan would be forthcoming. This, according the court, was mail fraud, 
a violation of RICO. 
The district court in Cefali v Buffalo Brass Co. 295 did not find a pattern of 
racketeering sufficient to uphold a RICO cause of action. In this case, the parent 
company, Atlantic Richfield, sold its metal division to American Brass Company. The 
plaintiffs were given two choices of either quitting and receiving Atlantic Richfield 
severance benefits or staying and collecting benefits from American Brass. The benefits 
of American Brass, according to Atlantic Richfield, were as good if not better than those 
already possessed. In addition, the plaintiffs were told that twenty days notice would be 
given prior to the sale of the division. Instead, the division was sold in six days and 
American Brass fired the plaintiffs. Alleging that the benefits offered by American Brass 
were in fact inferior to those at Atlantic Richfield, the plaintiffs refused to sign a waiver 
releasing American from any further obligation or liability upon termination. 
29-lg43 F.2d 666 (3rd. Cir. 1988). 
295653 F. Supp. 123 (W.D.Mo. 1986). 
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consequently, no benefits were given to the fired employees. The court ruled that no 
pattern of fraud was found, as the activity that transpired related to a single event - - the 
sale of the division. 296 
Injury to Business or Property 
An employee claiming violations of the RICO statute necessarily must show a 
damage to his business or property. 297 This has proved difficult on more than one 
occasion, but as the following discussion reveals, courts are more likely to rule favorably 
in circumstances where the alleged loss is in the form of lost income. 
In Acampora v Boise Cascade Corp. , 298 plaintiff discovered defendant Tisony' s 
theft from the company. As a result of this discovery, plaintiff was repeatedly subjected 
to harassment and eventually lost her job. While the plaintiff did not contend that she 
was directly injured by the stealing, her injury stemmed from an overall scheme of the 
predicate offenses and attempts to cover them up. It was these activities which caused the 
plaintiff to lose her job. Citing the earlier decision in Callan v State Chemical 
Manufacturing299 the court was "persuaded that plaintiff's alleged injury is sufficiently 
296See also, Bigger v American Commercial Air Lines, Inc., 652 F .Supp. 123 
(W.D.Mo. 1986) (company's failure to transfer excess assets from existing plan to a 
newly created plan in alleged breach of fiduciary duties did not form a pattern.). 
297 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). 
298635 F. Supp. 66 (D.N.J. 1986). 
299584 F.Supp. 619 (E.D.Pa 1984) (holding that although plaintiff was not injured by 
the predicate offenses of commercial bribery, refusal to participate in bribery and 
subsequent dismissal was compensable under RICO.). 
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related to defendant's alleged illegal conduct to enable her to maintain this action. "300 
The District Court for the Northern District of Indiana ruled differently on the 
same issue presented in Acampora in Kouvakas v Inlami Steel Co. 301 The defendant was 
alleged to have sent false invoices to customers over a two year period. The plaintiff, 
aware of the fraudulent practices, refused to participate. This refusal led to severe abuse 
and harassment by the defendants, which resulted in physical and mental symptoms of 
distress to the plaintiff. As a result of the disabilities, the plaintiff alleged inability to 
hold gainful employment and loss of consortium. The court dismissed the plaintiff's 
RICO claim, holding that the injuries suffered by the plaintiff were personal and a result 
of the harassment, not the alleged racketeering activities. 302 
Respondeat Superior 
By its construction, RICO is intended to recognize the enterprise as a victim of 
racketeering, seldom as the perpetrator. One of the questions with which courts have 
had to deal is the liability of the employer (enterprise) for acts of its employees. In 
Saporito, 303 the court decided that vicarious liability was possible in Section l 962(a) cases, 
300635 F.Supp. at 69; See, also, Komm v McFlicker, 662 F.Supp. 924 (W.D.Mo. 
1987) (action allowed as endorsed by 8th Cir.); But, see, Nodine v Textron, Inc., 819 
F. 2d 34 7 (1st Cir. 1987) (although plaintiff discharge is an injury to business or property 
it is not by reason of a RICO violation). 
301646 F. Supp. 474 (1986). 
302See, also, Callen v State Chemical Manufacturing Co., 584 F.Supp. 619 (E.D.Pa. 
1984) (holding that while loss of income as a result of racketeering activities is 
compensable, recovery for mental anguish and damage to reputation is denied.). 
-;o
3See infra note 294 and accompanying text. 
79 
but not in 1962( c) cases. 304 The Seventh Circuit has reached decisions in two recent 
cases, and based on the circumstances, ruled differently in each. 
In Liquid Air Corp. v Rogers,30s the plaintiff leased air compressors to the 
defendant's company, D & R Welding. Under the leasing agreement, D & R would pay 
for the compressors until they were returned to plaintiff. In an elaborate scheme 
involving an employee of Liquid Air, the records of return were falsified, thereby 
allowing D & R to retain the air compressors and not pay for them. In addition, 
defendant Rogers and other D & R officials helped the Liquid Air employee establish a 
private welding business in an area in which they were unable to operate due to a non-
competition agreement. They provided the new business with many of the air compressors 
owned by Liquid Air. The court upheld the action against Rogers on the grounds that 
D & R did in fact benefit from the racketeering activities and would be held liable. 
A second case, with somewhat similar circumstances, was presented to the 
Seventh Circuit in D & S Auto Pans, Inc. v Schwanz. 306 Here, an employee of the A.P. 
Walter Company was selling auto parts to one company and sending fraudulent invoices 
for the products to the plaintiff. After paying in excess of $150,(X)() the scam was 
discovered by the plaintiff who in tum informed Schwartz, president of Walter. 
Defendant immediately fired the employee and reported the incident to the State's 
~nlike § 1962(c), the court held that the language of § 1962(a) requires that no 
distinction be made between the person and the enterprise. 
305834 F.2d. 1297 (7th Cir. 1987). 
~38 F.2d. 964 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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Attorney. The court dismissed the claim against Schwartz, stating that "vicarious liability 
is inconsistent with this court's approach to direct RICO liability. 11307 The court found that 
the company, and Schwartz, as president, were unwitting victims of the employee's 
scheme, not the perpetrators. 
It appears from these cases that when the employer has received a benefit from the 
racketeering activity and could be viewed as committing the RICO offense, liability will 
incur. This same idea was previously expressed in the First Circuit3°8 and the Eighth 
Circuit. 309 
Employer uses of RICO 
"RICO is not a single-edged sword in employee relations, "310 and as such requires 
a look at those situations in which employers have brought cases against employees. The 
uses of RICO by employers are as numerous as those used by employees: 
embezzlement,311 violation of non-competition agreements, 312 theft of trade secrets,313 
destruction of property ,314 and conspiracy to steal customers315 are just a few of the ways 
301/d. at 966. 
308schofield v First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 793 F.2d. 28 (1st Cir. 1986). 
30\..uthi v Tonka Corp., 815 F.2d. 1229 (8th Cir. 1987). 
31°Shepard, Hom and Dunston, RICO and Employment La.w, 3 Lab. Law. 267, 282 
(1987). 
311See, e.g. ,United Fish Co. v Barnes, 627 F.Supp. 732 (D.Me. 1986). 
312See, e.g., Van Dom Co. v Howington, 623 F.Supp. 1548 (N.D.Ohio 1985). 
313See, e.g., Formax v Hostert, 841 F.2d 388 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
314See, e.g., Woodward v DiPalermo, 1 RICO Lit. Rep. (D.D.C. 1984). 
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RICO claims have been brought by employers to redress injuries arising out of alleged 
racketeering activities. 
315See, e.g., Systems Research, Inc. v Random Inc., 614 F.Supp. 494 (N.D.111. 
1985). 
CHAPTER VIII 
RICO AND QUID PRO QUO SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
THE FUNDAMENTALS OF EXTORTION 
Under Section 1961 of RICO, racketeering activity includes any act which is 
indictable under various provisions of the United States Criminal Code.316 Among the 
multitude of violations listed, Section 1951, relating to interference with commerce by 
threats or violence317 defines extortion as: 
the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by 
wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under 
color of official right. 318 
For purposes of this section, 'property' has been understood to mean many different 
things: freedom to make business decisions without outside interference, 319 the right to 
316 18 u.s.c. § 196l{l){b) (1982). 
317 18 u.s.c. § 1951 (1982). 
318 18 u.s.c. § 195l(b){2) (1982). 
319See, e.g., U.S. v Santoni, 585 F.2d 667 {4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 99 S.Ct. 
1221. 
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solicit business without fear of physical destruction and personal harm, 320 and unrealized 
business profits. 321 Most recently, the Third Circuit Court in New Jersey declared that the 
intangible rights afforded union members through the labor laws was within the realm of 
'property' protected by Section 1951.322 In this case, the government filed a civil 
complaint against several members of "The Provenzano Group" alleging that for the 
period beginning in 1961 through 1981, "[the defendants] extorted the membership's 
rights to vote, speak, and assemble freely by systematic acts of intimidation . . . "323 The 
court affirmed, holding that the various acts of murder and union office appointments 
conducted in the twenty year period violated the provisions of the Labor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act. 324 
In addition to a uniformly broad interpretation of the term 'property', the courts 
have also unanimously agreed that the obtaining of property does not imply that the one 
who is guilty of extortion necessarily must benefit from the extortionate act. 325 This idea 
320See, e.g, U.S. v Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 101 S.Ct. 
1359. 
321See, e.g., U.S. v Nadaline, 471 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied 93 S.Ct. 
1924. 
322See, U.S. v Local 560 of International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, 780 F.2d 267 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert. denied 106 
S.Ct. 2247; See also, Rodonich v House Wreckers Union, Local 95 of Laborers' 
International Union of North America, 627 F.Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
323780 F .2d. 267, 271. 
32429 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. 
325See, e.g., U.S. v Clemente, 640 F.2d 1069 (2nd Cir. 1981), cert. denied 102 S.Ct. 
102; U.S. v Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert. denied 100 S.Ct. 728; U.S. v 
Santoni, 585 F.2d 667 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 99 S.Ct. 1221; U.S. v Jacobs, 451 
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was first stated in U.S. v Green32Jj where the Supreme Court held that "extortion as defined 
in the statute in no way depends upon having a direct benefit conferred on the person who 
obtains the property. "327 The crux of the violation, therefore, is not so much a gain to the 
extortioner, but rather a loss to the victim. 
While the concepts of force and violence (actual or threatened) are generally 
understood, the meaning of the term 'fear' has received more attention from the courts. 
Similar to the general agreement concerning 'property,' the courts have been consistent 
in their reading of what constitutes fear, specifically the idea of economic harm. 328 It has 
become generally accepted that the offense of extortion not only includes a threat of 
physical force or violence, but a fear of economic loss as well. 
Courts have also determined that the intended victim of the extortionate acts need 
not know with certainty whether or not the defendant has the ability to carry out the 
threats made. 329 What is needed in these cases is a reasonable belief on the part of the 
victim that the extortioner has the authority or power to support the threats. 
F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1971), cen. denied 92 S.Ct. 1170; U.S. v Hyde, 448 F.2d 815 (5th 
Cir. 1971), cen. denied 92 S.Ct. 736. 
3~6 S.Ct. 522 (1956). 
321/d. at 526. 
328See, e.g., U.S. v Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561 (5th Cir. 1984); U.S. v Billups, 692 
F.2d 714 (4th Cir. 1982), cen. denied 104 S.Ct. 84; U.S. v Cusmano, 659 F.2d 714 (7th 
Cir. 1981). 
329See, e.g., U.S. v Furey, 491 F.Supp. 1048 (D.C.Pa. 1980) affd 636 F.2d 1211; 
U.S. v Salvitti, 464 F. Supp. 611 (D.C.Pa. 1979); U.S. v Brown, 540 F.2d 364 (8th 
Cir. 1976); 
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QUID PRO QUO SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS EXTORTION 
Under the EEOC Guidelines, "quid pro quo" sexual harassment occurs when 
"submission to or rejection of such [sexual harassment] conduct by an individual is used 
as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual. "330 The idea that "quid 
pro quo" harassment may be subject to criminal law was first articulated by the District 
of Columbia Circuit Court in Barnes v Costle. 331 In his concurring opinion, Judge 
MacKinnon stated that " [ w ]here sexual favors are solicited in return for job benefits or 
under retaliatory threats . . . the gravity of the incident might also constitute a violation 
of the criminal laws. "332 
In a typical case of sexual harassment the principles of extortion are clearly 
evident. The loss of a job333 or employment benefits334 resulting from the alleged conduct 
have been established as violations of Title VII. These types of losses are also within the 
realm of 'property' injury which give standing to sue under RICO, based on prohibited 
extortion activities. 335 
The requirement of threats, violence and/or fear accompany "quid pro quo" sexual 
33°29 C.F.R. § 1604. ll(a)(l)(2). 
331561 F.2d 983. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
332/d. at 995. 
333See, e.g. ,Miller v Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Tompkins v 
Public Service Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3rd Cir. 1977); Barnes v Costle 561 
F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
334See, e.g., Henson v City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). 
335See, e.g., notes 318 and accompanying text. 
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harassment claims as well. 336 The Eleventh Circuit, in Sparks v Pilot Freight Carriers,331 
upheld a claim in which the defendant made threatening remarks such as "your fate is in 
my hands, "338 which "so frightened the plaintiff, she doubted her job security. 11339 
In a recent case in the District Court, 340 the plaintiff was told that she had "'better 
do something nice' [or the defendant] would 'get mean. "'341 Judge Boyle credited 
plaintiffs testimony that "she was so frightened by the implications of these remarks that 
she did not report for work . . . "342 
In yet another decision,343 testimony provided at trial indicated that plaintiff had 
"extreme distress and concern about the supervisor's unwelcomed advances and the fear 
of losing her job . . . "344 
The basic idea of 11 quid pro quo" harassment as extortion has been reiterated by 
336Jn Valerio v Dahlberg, 716 F.Supp. 1031, 1039 (1988), the District Court for the 
Southern District of Ohio ruled that "sexual favors need not actually be exchanged to 
have quid pro quo harassment, they need only be proposed with a threatened or implied 
detriment . . . " [emphasis added]. 
337830 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1987). 
338/d. at 1556. 
340Coley v Consolidated Rail Corp., 561 F.Supp. 645 (E.D.Mich. 1982). 
341/d. at 647. 
34Wilcox v Boeing Military Airplane Company & Hubert E. Richerson, 1989 U.S. 
Dist. Lexis 11034. 
344/d. at 9. 
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the courts on a number of occasions. In its seminal opinion in Henson v City of 
Dundee,345 the Eleventh Circuit stated that a "quid pro quo" claim rests on the ability of 
the supervisor to use either actual or apparent authority to "extort sexual considertion 
from an employee. "346 
The idea of "quid pro quo" harassment as a tort claim for extortion has been 
attempted in two instances, yet these claims have been rejected. In Bouchet v The 
National Urban League, 341 the plaintiff, an attorney, lost her job through what she 
considered 'sexual extortion.' In the opinion rendered in the case, Judge Scalia wrote: 
[W]ith regard to appellants self-styled 'sexual extortion' claim, [which] 
rests upon activities such as disrupting Bouchet's work and threatening 
her with the loss of her job unless she provided sexual favors, we have not 
found, and have not been cited by appellant, any precedent in D.C. cases 
rendering such activities actionable, or any indication that the D.C. courts 
are moving in that direction. We cannot create a new tort on behalf of the 
District . . . 348 
While the courts that have considered claims for extortion under tort theory have rejected 
the plaintiff's argument, the dismissal has rested not on the fact that extortion did not 
345682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). 
346/d. at 910; See, also, Schroeder v Schock, 42 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 1112, 
1114 (D.Kan. 1986)( "In a quid pro quo sexual harassment case, the supervisor is relying 
on and 'using' his authority ... to exton sexual consideration from an employee 
[emphasis added]); Sowers v Kemira, 701 F.Supp. 809, 827 (S.D. Ga. 1988) ("a 
supervisor in quid pro quo harassment is using his authority to exton sexual consideration 
from an employee. "[emphasis added]). 
347730 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also, Helwig v Suburban Chevrolet, Inc., 33 
Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 1261 (D.Md. 1983). 
~30 F.2d at 807. 
occur, but rather on the fact that a tort theory for extortion does not exist. 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT, EXTORTION, AND RICO 
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To date, one case has been presented at the district level charging that sexual 
harassment has violated the RICO statute. In Hunt v Weatherbee, 349 the defendant's 
motion to dismiss was rejected by the court. Plaintiff, Rosa Hunt, alleged that she was 
subjected to a continuing pattern and practice of sex discrimination and sexual harassment 
as an apprentice in the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 
40. In a 13 count complaint, Hunt brought charges under the federal statutes of RICO, 
the Civil Rights Act, Sections 1985(2),(3) and 1986, and the Landrum-Griffin Act. In 
addition, various state claims for violation of civil rights were attached to the complaint. 
The RICO claims brought by the plaintiff stem first from an incident in 1981 at 
which time Hunt was assaulted by a fellow employee. When a criminal complaint was 
filed by Hunt against the co-worker, she was called to a meeting with union officials, 
including Weatherbee. At the meeting, she was coerced and intimidated into withdrawing 
the complaint through accusations that she was responsible for the assault and sundry 
forms of sexual animus. A second incident occurred in 1984, when Hunt was assigned, 
through Local 40, to a project under the direction of Turner Construction and its 
supervisor, Mark Dirksmeir. Shortly after starting the project, Hunt was approached by 
the shop steward, Joe Shaw, to purchase raffle tickets for the Local 40 Political Action 
Fund. Shaw allegedly made threats to physically harm Hunt if she did not buy the raffle 
349626 F. Supp. 1097 (D.Mass. 1986). 
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tickets. Weatherbee, upon learning of the confrontation from Hunt, refused to act. 
When these threats were repeated to Hunt, in the presence of Dirksmeir, he also declined 
to take any action. Fearing for her safety, Hunt left the worksite and never returned to 
work as a Local 40 worker. Six months after this incident, Hunt filed her action against 
the defendants. 
The defendants moved to dismiss Hunt's RICO claim on three grounds.35° First, 
they argued, loss of wages is not actionable under the statute. Second, the predicate acts 
of coercion to withdraw her criminal complaint and purchase raffle tickets do not meet 
the pattern of racketeering activity requirement of RICO. Finally, they contended that 
Hunt failed to allege a nexus between the defendants and organized crime. Th:: ant 
disagreed, and upheld Hunt's RICO complaint. The loss of wages, as an injury to 
business or property, is given credence by the Supreme Court's decision in Sedima. 
Here, the Court said that in determining a business injury, courts are advised to look to 
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, (15 U.S.C. § 15). Citing relevant cases, Judge Young held 
that in the antitrust context the loss of an opportunity to perform work is indeed an injury 
to business or property. In regard to the pattern requirement under RICO, the court held 
that the coercion to withdraw the criminal complaint and purchase raffle tickets are 
actionable as predicate acts of extortion under both federal and state codes. The pattern 
requirement is met by virtue of the fact that these two incidents are simply examples of 
a prolonged practice of sexual harassment and are sufficient to demonstrate a claim under 
35°The defendants argued that Hunt's claim is really one for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, and as such not actionable under RICO. 
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RICO. The defendants motion to dismiss was denied. 
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
The Hunt case presents an interesting departure from the usual "quid pro quo" 
theory of sexual harassment in that at no time were sexual favors allegedly required from 
the plaintiff. On its surface, this appears to be a hostile work environment claim of 
sexual harassment. The EEOC, however, has recently stated that "although 'quid pro 
quo' and 'environmental' harassment are theoretically distinct claims, the line between 
the two is not always clear and the two forms of harassment often occur together. "351 
While Title VII action requires unwelcome sexual conduct as a prerequisite to claims of 
sexual harassment, the complaint in Hunt appears to introduce a new form of "quid pro 
quo harassment." In upholding the plaintiff's claim for RICO violations based on sexual 
harassment, it could be argued that a quid pro quo violation occurs when action is 
demanded by a claimant by virtue of her sex, regardless of whether the action demanded 
is for sexual favors. In the instant case, Hunt was forced, because of her sex, to accede 
351Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Policy Guidance on Cu"ent Issues 
of Sexual Harassment, N-915.035 (October 25, 1988), at 2. 
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to the demands of her superiors or suffer the consequences (i.e., physical harm and, 
ultimately, loss of her job). m 
It is difficult to say with certainty whether other courts would recognize a cause 
of action under RICO for claims of "quid pro quo" harassment. The idea that this type 
of harassment is analogous to extortion, a RICO offense, has been demonstrated. The 
injury requirement in the form of lost income or benefits (which results from 
noncompliance with the demand for sexual favors), has also been upheld. Proving the 
pattern requirement can be established by a review of the incidents which led up to the 
injury sustained by the plaintiff. 
The most difficult requirement to meet under a RICO case involving sexual 
harassment would be found in the liability of the employer for the actions of the 
employee. Under Section 1962(c)353 it is unlawful for anyone employed by an enterprise 
to conduct the activities of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering. In "quid pro 
quo" sexual harassment under Title VII, the courts and the EEOC have unquestionably 
held the employer liable for the acts of its supervisory employees. However, the 
respondeat superior theory of liability under RICO has not fared well in the courts, 
particularly where the employer receives no benefit from the illegal activity. 354 
352In Pease v Alford Photo Industries, Inc., 667 F.Supp. 1188 (W.D.Tenn. 1987) the 
court ruled that the plaintiff, subjected to a sexually hostile work environment was the 
victim of quid pro quo harassment when she refused, under orders of the employer's 
wife, to stop complaining to the plant manager about the sexual harassment. The 
plaintiff's unwillingness to drop the matter led to her dismissal from the company. 
35318 U.S.C. § 1962(c). 
3S4See supra notes 303-309 and accompanying text. 
93 
Arguably the greatest obstacle facing any potential RICO claimant is found in the 
current status of the law. The civil provisions of RICO went virtually unnoticed 
throughout the 1970's. 355 Following the Supreme Court's adherence356 to the liberal 
construction clause of RICO, "within two years the number of RICO suits topped 
1,000. 11357 Given the broad interpretation of RICO endorsed by the Supreme Court, suits 
have been filed in such diverse situations as abortion protests, 358 public utilities, 3' 9 livestock 
weighing,360 and product liability. 361 Clearly, "[T]he statute doesn't apply to blue-collar 
people only, or no-collar people only, it applies to everybody. "362 
mJost, Racketeering Law Comes Under Attack, 1989 Ediitorial Research Reports 134, 
136, citing Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of the ABA Section of 
Corporation, Banking and Business Law (1985}. ("through 1980 ... found only 14 
written court decisions in civil RICO suits during the entire decade."). 
356105 S.Ct. at 3286. ("The statute's 'remedial purposes' are nowhere more evident 
than in the provision for a private action for those injured by a racketeering injury."). 
351/d. at 142. 
358See, e.g., Northeast Women's Center v McMonagle, 670 F.Supp. 1300 (E.D.Pa. 
1987} (holding that an abortion clinic has standing to sue where protestors harass 
employees and clients and trespass on property}. 
359See, e.g., County of Suffolk v Long Island Lighting Company, 685 F.Supp 38 
(E. D. N. Y. 1988). (customers sue utility alleging construction of power plants was 
designed to increase rates}. 
360See, e.g., Gerace v Utica Veal Co., Inc., 580 F.Supp 1465 (N.D.N.Y. 1984} 
(infected cattle sent for slaughter were misweighed and misgraded resulting in lower 
payments to farmers). 
361See, e.g., Campbell v A.H. Robins, 615 F.Supp 496 (D.Wis. 1985) (Insurer sued 
for injury resulting from defective contraceptive device). 
362ABC News, Nightline, April 12, 1989 (Show #2058}. Statement of G. Robert 
Blakey, Prof. of Law, Notre Dame University. Mr. Blakey was one of the drafters of 
RICO in his position of Chief Counsel to the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and 
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But RICO is not without its critics. As one commentator noted, "by drafting 
[RICO] so broadly its caught up so many people that Congress never intended to catch 
up, people whose only contact with a racket is the occasional tennis game, clearly not 
what Congress intended to do.[sic] I think they have to go back to the drawing board. "363 
The judicial system has suggested that Congress amend the statute. In the opinion 
handed down in Sedima, Justice White noted that private actions are being brought against 
legitimate businesses rather than the typical 'mobster.' To remedy the situation, however, 
"this defect - if defect it is - is inherent in the statute as written, and its correction must 
lie with Congress. "364 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist has also been critical of the increase in civil RICO 
cases, commenting that the cases often have no link to organized crime and are crowding 
the federal courts. 365 
In the federal legislature, attempts have continually been made to reform the civil 
provisions of RICO. 366 The current Congress, believing that there has been "an explosion 
Procedure. 
363/d. Statement of L. Gordon Crovitz, Assistant Editor of The Wall Street Journal 
Editorial Page. 
364105 S.Ct. at 3287. 
365R.ehnquist, Get RICO Out of My Coun, Wall St. J. 
May 19, 1989, at sec. A, p.14. 
366See, generally, Proposed RICO RefonnLegislation: Hearings Before the Committee 
on the Judiciary, (1985, 1987); RICO Refonn: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary, (1985-1986); Oversight on Civil RICO 
Suits: Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, (1985). 
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of abusive and harassing lawsuits, "367 has introduced legislation which, while not removing 
the civil remedy of RICO.will reduce the treble damages currently afforded in the statute 
as well as limit the situations under which a suit can be brought. 
Specific attention to the Hunt case was paid in the most recent attempts by 
Congress to reform the RICO statute. When Senator Deconcini introduced legislation to 
reform the RICO law36a he was joined by Senator Hatch, who remarked that: 
[U]nder recent case law, civil RICO can be used in wrongful discharge 
cases, e.g., Williams v Hall (citations omitted) and sexual harassment 
cases, Hunt v Weatherbee (citations omitted). Now, obviously, persons 
may be entitled to relief in these and other circumstances of business 
wrongdoing, but trebling damages in such cases is not appropriate and may 
eventually work a revolution in our law. 369 
Until such time as the reform measures pass Congress, however, a cause of action for 
"quid pro quo" sexual harassment under RICO remains. 
367135 Cong. Rec. Sl652 (remarks of Sen. Deconcini) 
36al35 Cong. Rec. S1652. 
369/d. at S1656. 
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